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I. INTRODUCTION
Environmentalists habitually bring their federal claims to federal court.
Only a handful of citizen suits under national environmental statutes have
surfaced in the state courts. This pattern may reflect environmental lawyers'
greater familiarity with federal procedure, their fear of state court bias, or
their greater confidence in the quality of federal adjudication. Perhaps it
reflects a mistaken belief that state courts generally lack concurrent
jurisdiction over federal environmental claims. The task I shoulder here is
not to plumb the origins of this pattern, but to predict and defend a
change-a new role for state courts in adjudicating claims under federal
environmental law. It is my contention that state courts can, will, and
should adjudicate the federal environmental claims of parties who lack
Article Ili standing (non-Article III plaintiffs).
My prediction emerges from no insider knowledge of
environmentalists' litigation strategy. Rather, it takes root in the
principle that, in law as in markets and ecosystems, unexploited niches
come to be filled. This Note reveals an open niche.' Three jurisprudential
developments that came to a head in the last decade make state courts
increasingly attractive fora for the private enforcement of federal
I. Thus, my "prediction" more resembles self-fulfilling prophecy than inference from
scientifically tested hypotheses.
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environmental law. First, under the intellectual leadership of Justice Scalia,
the Supreme Court elaborated constitutional doctrines of standing that
curtail environmentalists' access to the federal courts. Second, in the
underappreciated case of ASARCO v. Kadish,2 the Supreme Court
decisively affirmed the right of state courts to adjudicate federal claims that
do not present federally justiciable "cases or controversies." New doctrinal
architecture unveiled in ASARCO reverses the longstanding principle that
state court decisions on claims brought by non-Article III plaintiffs lack
collateral effect in federal courts. Third, the Court continued to strengthen
the presumption of concurrent jurisdiction. One can argue reasonably that
seven of the nine major environmental statutes now accommodate state
court jurisdiction, notwithstanding several lower court decisions to the
contrary.
It is no accident that the milestone cases in the modem development of
Article III standing pertain to environmental matters.3 Laws usually aim to
improve the condition of a class of people. To violate the law is to hurt a
member of this class, creating the central predicate of Article III standing:
"injury in fact." 4 Most environmental laws aim to improve the condition of
the natural world. Sometimes conditions in the natural world bear on the
well-being of people, and harms to the environment translate into injuries in
fact to human beings. Yet, immediate connections between environmental
damage and human welfare are not inevitable. Within the ambit of
environmental law are remote and rarely visited lands;5 uncommon and
inconspicuous species; 6 and the depths of the seas.7 Even when concern for
human health or welfare motivates a statute, and environmental protection
is only penultimate, the connection between regulated activities and human
well-being can be roundabout or probabilistic. A doctrine of standing
bottomed on causation and redressability could impede citizen-suit
enforcement, much as the complexities of proving causation ensnarl
common-law environmental claims.8 All "ideological" plaintiffs would
benefit from liberal state court standing to enforce federal law, but
environmentalists have the most to gain.
The argument of this Note unfolds in four segments. In Part II, I
provide a brief overview of the law of standing in state courts. My goal in
2. 490 U.S. 605 (1989).
3. These case are surveyed infra Section II.A.
4. The other predicates are "causation" and "redressability." Infra Section III.A.
5. E.g., Federal Land Policy and Management Act, 43 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1784 (1994).
6. E.g., Endangered Species Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1544 (1994).
7. E.g., Deep Seabed Hard Mineral Resources Act, 30 U.S.C. §§ 1401-1473 (1994).
8. Cf. Robert L. Rabin, Environmental Liability and the Tort System, 24 Hous. L. REV. 27,
29 (1987) (describing the scientific complexity of proving causation in toxic tort cases). The
Supreme Court's recent holding in Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Environmental Services,
Inc., 528 U.S. 167 (2000), does reduce the causation burden on environmental standing, but it is
too early to assess Laidlaw's ramifications. See infra notes 41-44 and accompanying text.
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Part II is simply to convey a sense of the various ways in which state
standing law advantages public-interest plaintiffs. An in-depth, state-by-
state examination of standing doctrine would be far beyond the scope of
this Note.
Part III lays out recent developments in Supreme Court jurisprudence
and shows how they presage the growth of federal environmental claims in
state courts. This Part discusses constitutional standing, ASARCO and its
antecedents, and the important concurrent jurisdiction decisions. I evaluate
concurrent jurisdiction under the major environmental statutes, and argue
that all but the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Cleanup, and
Liability Act (CERCLA)9 and the Toxic Substances Control Act (TSCA) l°
should be read to authorize state court jurisdiction. Finally, Part III asks
whether the Supreme Court's nondiscrimination doctrine affirmatively
requires state courts to apply their own, more liberal rules of justiciability to
federal claims. I conclude that it does not.
In Part IV, the tenor of the Note changes. Moving from the positive to
the normative, I defend ASARCO and the logic of lenient state court
standing for federal claims. In so doing, I rebut academic attacks issued a
generation apart by Professor Freund and Judge Fletcher, respectively, who
propose that state courts hearing federal claims be required to treat Article
III standing as a federal question. One cannot defend ASARCO without an
interpretive theory of the Supremacy Clause, one of the structural keystones
of the Constitution. I use the Supreme Court's recent federalism and
separation-of-powers decisions to frame my account of the Supremacy
Clause. My jurisprudential argument runs as follows: When interpreting a
structural provision of the Constitution, the Supreme Court should begin
with an inquiry into dangers. If the provision guards against "tyranny" or
other remote but horrific eventualities, the Court should interpret it with
formal rules that keep one branch from assuming control over the settled
practices of another. Otherwise, the Court should build doctrine-rules,
where feasible-from the fairest reading of the text the Court can muster.
Working within this framework, I consider and rebut the thesis that
state court adjudication of federal claims brought by non-Article III
plaintiffs transgresses the separation of powers and, as such, should be
warded off prophylactically. This question settled, I evaluate the ASARCO
rule in terms of the twin meanings of supremacy: power and quality.
ASARCO's framework for state court adjudication of non-Article HI
plaintiffs' federal claims does more for the power and quality of federal law
than would the Freund-Fletcher alternative.
9. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (1994).
10. 15 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2629 (1994).
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In Part V, the Note assesses consequences. I use the Emergency
Planning and Community Right-To-Know Act," whose citizen-suit
provision was gutted by the Supreme Court's standing decision in Steel Co.
v. Citizens for a Better Environment,12 to illustrate the practical implications
of liberal state court standing. 3
II. PRELUDE: STANDING IN STATE COURTS
State courts do not run "public interest" and other ideological plaintiffs
through the obstacle course erected by the U.S. Supreme Court under the
guise of Article HI. Most state courts are courts of general jurisdiction,
unfettered by constitutional provisions analogous to Article III. True, out of
respect for the legislature, or out of a sense of their own limitations, these
courts customarily decline to rule on questions of law absent something like
a case or controversy.' 4 But state courts need not follow the Supreme
Court's jurisprudence in this regard, and, in practice, their default rules of
justiciability tend to be more liberal.' 5
Unencumbered by constitutional constraints, state courts and
legislatures often relax the background rules of standing in ways
11. 42 U.S.C. §§ 11001-11050.
12. 523 U.S. 83 (1998); see infra notes 193-199 and accompanying text.
13. This Note is the second to explore the implications of ASARCO for the enforcement of
federal environmental law. Another commentator took note of ASARCO and suggested that
Congress use the threat of federal preemption to induce state legislatures to authorize their courts
to hear the federal claims of non-Article IIl plaintiffs. William Grantham, Note, Restoring Citizen
Suits After Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife: The Use of Cooperative Federalism To Induce Non-
Article III Standing in State Courts, 21 VT. L. REV. 977 (1997). My contribution differs from
Grantham's in three respects. First, I show that many states already apply liberal standing to
environmental claims; Congress need not pressure these states to relax their laws of standing.
Second, I analyze concurrent jurisdiction under the present constellation of federal environmental
laws and show that state courts can enforce most of them. When juxtaposed against the recent
concurrent jurisdiction decisions, ASARCO has immediate implications for the enforcement of
federal environmental law. Public-interest litigators do not necd Congress to enact the implausible
affront to norms of federalism that Grantham proposes. Third, I make a foray into constitutional
theory and develop a new rationale for the ASARCO holding. Incidentally, my jurisprudential
analysis of the structural provisions of the Constitution indicates that Grantham's proposal might
run afoul of separation-of-powers principles. See infra note 155 and accompanying text.
14. See, e.g., Brown Mech. Contractors v. Centennial Ins. Co., 431 So. 2d 932 (Ala. 1983);
Estes v. Walters, 601 S.W.2d 252 (Ark. Ct. App. 1980); Washakie County Sch. Dist. Number One
v. Herschler, 606 P.2d 310 (Wyo. 1980).
15. See, e.g., Me. Ass'n of Interdependent Neighborhoods v. Comm'r, Me. Dep't of Human
Servs., 876 F.2d 1051, 1054 (1st Cir. 1989) (acknowledging that Maine's law of standing is more
liberal than its federal counterpart); Langford v. Superior Court, 729 P.2d 822, 833 n.6 (Cal. 1987)
("California's [standing] requirements are less stringent than those imposed by federal law.");
Pele Def. Fund v. Paty, 837 P.2d 1247, 1257 (Haw. 1992) (showing that Hawaii has adopted a
broader view than the federal courts have of what constitutes a personal stake in cases involving
public rights); State v. Alston, 440 A.2d 1311, 1314-18 (N.J. 1981) (granting vehicle passengers
standing to challenge a search and seizure, despite contrary holdings from the U.S. Supreme
Court); Suffolk Hous. Serv. v. Town of Brookhaven, 397 N.Y.S.2d 302, 308-11 (Sup. Ct. 1977)
(contrasting trends in New York and Article III standing law as regards challenges to exclusionary
zoning).
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advantageous to environmental plaintiffs. 6 Prominent examples include
judge-made exceptions for cases of "great public import," taxpayer-
standing laws, and environmental rights acts. Not every green gripe rises to
the level of "great public import,, 17 but taxpayer standing and
environmental rights acts present manifold opportunities for public-interest
plaintiffs.
Taxpayer standing empowers citizens, in their capacity as taxpayers, to
counter the illegal expenditure of tax revenues and other threats to the
public fisc.' s Taxpayer standing could be used to challenge state
construction and development projects-highways, irrigation systems, river
channelization, and the like-that would violate federal environmental
laws. Every state except New Mexico recognizes taxpayer standing;' 9 some
even authorize taxpayer challenges to nonfiscal matters,2" which opens up
further opportunities to contest state agencies' implementation of federal
environmental law.2' Environmental rights acts or constitutional provisions
in fifteen states confer broad citizen standing to challenge ecologically
deleterious activities. 2' Fourteen provide for lawsuits against virtually any
entity; the exception, Maryland, focuses more narrowly on claims against
governmental entities.23 Only three of the environmental rights acts
16. Even though state courts are not cabined by a state constitutional analogue to Article III,
it is conceivable that state courts would derive a constitutional law of standing from the
constitutional structure of state government. I have managed to unearth only two examples of this
kind of thinking: Life of the Land v. Land Use Commission, 623 P.2d 431 (Haw. 1981), and Texas
Ass 'n of Business v. Texas Air Control Board, 852 S.W. 440 (Tex. 1993).
17. For examples of " great public import" disputes, see Shapiro v. Columbia Union National
Bank & Trust Co., 576 S.W.2d 310 (Mo. 1978); Blaikie v. Lindsay, 321 N.Y.S.2d 388 (Sup. Ct.
1971); Jenkins v. State, 585 P.2d 442 (Utah 1978); DeFunis v. Odegaard, 529 P.2d 438 (Wash.
1974); and Milwaukee Professional Firefighters, Local 215 v. City of Milwaukee, 253 N.W.2d
481 (Wis. 1977).
18. Susan L. Parsons, Comment, Taxpayers' Suits: Standing Barriers and Pecuniary
Restraints, 59 TEMP. L.Q. 951, 967-68 (1986) (citing cases).
19. Id. at 962-63.
20. See, e.g., Blair v. Pitchess, 486 P.2d 1242 (Cal. 1971) (holding that California law
authorized taxpayer actions for any illegal expenditure of public funds). See generally 74 AM.
JUR. 2D Taxpayers' Actions § 27 (1999) (citing cases upholding taxpayer standing tor nonfiscal
matters in Colorado, Kansas, Kentucky, Maryland, New Jersey, New York, and West Virginia).
21. Many federal environmental laws are implemented via "cooperative federalism," with
state agencies in the lead. For a concise overview of the role of cooperative federalism in federal
law, see Roderick M. Hills, Jr., The Political Economy of Cooperative Federalism: Why State
Autonomy Makes Sense and "Dual Federalism" Doesn't, 96 MICH. L. REV. 813, 858-71 (1998).
22. HAW. CONST. art. XI, § 9; ILL. CONST. art. XI, § 2; CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 22a-14 to -20
(1999); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 403.412 (West 2000); IND. CODE §§ 13-30-1-1 to 13-30-1-12 (2000);
IOWA CODE § 455B. 111 (1999); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 30:2026 (West 2000); MD. CODE ANN.,
NAT. RES. §§ 1-501 to -508 (2000); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 214, § 7A (2000); MIcH. COMP. LAWS
§§ 324.1701-.1706 (2000); MINN. STAT. §§ 116B.01-.13 (2000); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN.
§§ 41.540-.570 (Michie 2000); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2A:35A-1 to :35A-14 (West 1999); N.D.
CENT. CODE §§ 32-40-01 to 32-40-11 (2000); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS §§ 34A-10-1 to 34A-10-17
(Michie 2000).
23. MD. CODE ANN., NAT. RES. § 1-503(b).
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condition standing on personal injury or harm.24 Viewed from the
advocate's perspective, environmental rights acts and taxpayer standing
laws mesh together beautifully. Many environmental rights acts enable non-
Article III plaintiffs to bring lawsuits against industries and landowners,
5
whereas taxpayer standing facilitates claims against state agencies.
Surely some states follow Article III standing, or invent even more
restrictive doctrines. 26 I do not mean to deny state-to-state variation in
standing law. But when considered together, the generous background
principles of state court standing, the great-public-import exceptions, the
taxpayer standing doctrines, and the environmental rights acts define a
climate of state court openness toward public-interest litigants.
111. SUPREME COURT JURISPRUDENCE
I now turn to developments in U.S. Supreme Court jurisprudence that
should motivate environmental advocates to pause before rushing off to the
federal courthouse. I begin with the recent and familiar history of Article III
standing. Then I recount the Court's affirmation of the right of state courts
to hear federal claims absent a federally justiciable case or controversy, and
explain how, in ASARCO, state court judgments in favor of non-Article III
plaintiffs garnered collateral effect in federal court. Third, I review the
Court's increasingly emphatic defense of the presumption of concurrent
jurisdiction, and tease out the implications for state court enforcement of
the federal environmental statutes.
A. Article III Standing
My purpose in this Section is not to evaluate the coherence or
desirability of the Court's standing decisions; rather, I want to convey in
broad strokes the evolution of doctrine as seen through the lens of the
24. These three exceptions are Iowa, IOWA CODE § 455B.1 11, Louisiana, LA. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 30:2026, and North Dakota, N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-40-06.
25. Note, however, that two of the environmental rights acts only liberalize standing to
challenge violations of state law. IOWA CODE § 455B.1 11; LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 30:2026. Two
more restrict claims against defendants who are in compliance with state regulations. IND. CODE
§ 13-30-1-8(1) (stating that showing compliance with "applicable rule[s] adopted by a state
agency" is a prima facie defense); MINN. STAT. § II 6B.03(1) (disallowing actions for conduct
taken pursuant to any standard, limitation, rule, order, license, stipulation agreement, or permit
issued by a relevant state agency).
26. The Virginia legislature, for instance, has imposed standing requirements more restrictive
than Article III on persons challenging air pollution permits. See Maria Farinella, Comment, The
Clean Air Act of 1990: Title V's Operating Permit Provision for Citizen Access to State Court
Judicial Review, 8 ADMIN. L.J. AM. U. 67, 83-87 (1994) (recounting the passage of amendments
to the state Air Pollution Control Law).
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environmental standing cases. Readers familiar with this body of case law
can skip forward to Section III.B.
The seminal decision of the modem era is Sierra Club v. Morton,27 in
which the Supreme Court acknowledged that "aesthetic and recreational"
injuries to people who use an area proposed for development can amount to
an "injury in fact" sufficient for standing to challenge the development.
Environmental standing seemed wide-open in the 1970s,28 but in the 1980s
and 1990s, the Court tightened the screws on green plaintiffs. Lujan v.
National Wildlife Federation (Lujan J)29 reworked the conceptualization of
"injury in fact." The National Wildlife Federation had challenged the
Department of Interior's reclassification of some 1250 tracts of federal
land, opening these properties to mining. Wildlife Federation affiants stated
that they used lands "in the vicinity" of areas affected by two of the 1250
reclassifications. 3' But the Supreme Court denied standing, on the grounds
that the affiants did not utilize the particular portion of the tract of land
(some 4500 acres out of two million) newly opened to mining.3
On the heels of Lujan I came Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife (Lujan
I),32 in which the high court specified that an "injury in fact" must be
"actual or imminent," not "conjectural or hypothetical."33 Defenders of
Wildlife had challenged the failure of the U.S. Agency for International
Development to consult with the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, pursuant
to the Endangered Species Act, prior to funding projects alleged to threaten
the Nile crocodile and the Asian elephant and leopard. To secure standing,
Defenders produced affidavits from two members who had visited the
habitat of these animals in the past, and planned to do so again. The
Supreme Court ruled, however, that such "'some day' intentions [to
return]" flunk the test of imminence. 4 Drawing upon nonenvironmental
cases from the 1970s and 1980s, the Court went on to explain that Article
III standing also requires a showing of causation and redressability as
complements to injury in fact.35 And in categorically rejecting standing for
27. 405 U.S. 727 (1972).
28. E.g., United States v. Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures, 412 U.S. 669
(1973) (holding that law students had standing to challenge an Interstate Commerce Commission
order authorizing higher charges for rail freight, on the grounds that higher shipping costs would
stymie recycling and thus pollute the environment in which the law students lived and recreated).
29. 497 U.S. 871 (1990).
30. Id. at 886 (citations omitted).
31. Id. at 885-89.
32. 504 U.S. 555 (1992).
33. Id. at 560 (citations omitted).
34. Id. at 564.
35. Id. at 571-78.
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purely "procedural" injuries, the four-Justice plurality denied Congress the
power to define new forms of injury.36
The question of redressability came to the fore in Steel Co. v. Citizens
for a Better Environment,37 which addresses citizen suits for wholly past
violations under the Emergency Planning and Community Right To Know
Act (EPCRA).3" EPCRA instructs users of specified toxic and hazardous
chemicals to file annual reports explaining their use and emissions of the
listed chemicals. In 1995, Citizens for a Better Environment sent a "notice
of intent to sue" letter to Steel Company, the EPA, and state officials,
alleging a pattern of reporting violations dating back to 1988. During the
mandatory sixty-day waiting period between the notice letter and the date
of suit, Steel Company filed all of the missing reports. The citizens' group
brought suit anyway, seeking a declaratory judgment, civil penalties,
attorneys' fees, and authorization to inspect Steel Company's facility and
records. None of these, ruled the Court, would eliminate the effects of late
reporting or compensate the plaintiffs for losses they had suffered.39 Unlike
an award of damages, civil penalties would accrue to the U.S. Treasury, not
to the plaintiffs, and so could not redress the plaintiffs' injuries."
Most recently, in one of its first opinions of the new millennium, the
Supreme Court clarified two points of confusion about injury and
redressability. Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Environmental
Services4 establishes, first, that environmental standing does not turn on
actual or imminent damage to the environment; rather, a reasonable fear of
economic and aesthetic harm suffices.42 Laidlaw allowed citizen plaintiffs
to challenge "continuous and pervasive illegal discharges of pollutants into
a river," 43 notwithstanding the district court's finding that no environmental
harm had resulted. On a second front, Laidlaw stipulates that civil damages
can redress the risk of future violations. It follows that standing doctrine
does not bar private enforcement of civil penalties if further violations are
in the offing."
In time, scholars may come to see Laidlaw as a turning point in the
Supreme Court's standing jurisprudence, but nowhere in that decision does
the Court question the propriety of Steel Co. or the Lujan dyad. The barriers
36. Id. at 571-78. The Court of Appeals had ruled that the Endangered Species Act creates
certain "procedural rights" that any person may enforce, irrespective of distinct, concrete injury.
Defenders of Wildlife v. Lujan, 911 F.2d 117, 121 (8th Cir. 1990).
37. 523 U.S. 83 (1998).
38. 42 U.S.C. § 11001 (1994).
39. Steel Co., 523 U.S. at 105-10.
40. Id. at 106-07.
41. 528 U.S. 167 (2000).
42. Id. at 184-85.
43. Id. at 184.
44. Id. at 184-88.
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to "private attorney general" enforcement of federal environmental law
erected in those opinions still endure.
B. State Courts, Federal Claims, and Article III
The Supreme Court continues to affirm the right of state courts to apply
their own, more lenient rules of justiciability to federal claims. This practice
dates back to 1952,4" when, in Doremus v. Board of Education,46 Justice
Jackson somewhat tentatively suggested that state courts need not hew to
the emerging principles of Article III standing. Justice Jackson's cautious
endorsement of state court discretion subsequently hardened into black-
letter law. There were a couple of bumps along the way,47 but three
Supreme Court decisions in the mid-1980s matter-of-factly affirm, in dicta,
the Doremus standard."a Finally, in the 1989 case of ASARCO v. Kadish,49
the Supreme Court made it definitive: State courts' application of home-
grown rules of justiciability to federal claims "properly follows from the
allocation of authority in the federal system."5 This proposition about
federalism won the assent of all eight sitting Justices.51
Prior to ASARCO, state court rulings on the claims of non-Article III
plaintiffs were not reviewable by the U.S. Supreme Court, and as such, had
no collateral effect in federal court.52 ASARCO resolves this nagging
difficulty. Conjuring a novel legal fiction, Justice Kennedy characterized
the Arizona Supreme Court's ruling for the plaintiff Kadish as an injury in
fact to the defendant-intervenor ASARCO, thereby giving ASARCO
standing to appeal to the U.S. Supreme Court. This right is asymmetric;
had ASARCO prevailed in the state supreme court, Kadish, the non-Article
III plaintiff, would have had no recourse to the U.S. Supreme Court.54 It
45. There were earlier inklings of this philosophy, but not until Doremus did a majority of the
Court provide an exposition. For the antecedents, see William A. Fletcher, The "Case or
Controversy" Requirement in State Court Adjudication of Federal Questions, 78 CAL. L. REV.
263, 272-78 (1990).
46. 342 U.S. 429 (1952).
47. See, e.g., DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312, 316-20 (1974) (vacating and remanding a
state supreme court ruling that the Court deemed nonjusticiable by the terms of Article I1).
DeFunis and another perplexing decision, New Jersey v. Portash, 440 U.S. 450 (1979), are
discussed in William P. Murphy, Supreme Court Review of Abstract State Court Decisions on
Federal Law: A Justiciability Analysis, 25 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 473, 478-83 (1981).
48. See Pennell v. City of San Jose, 485 U.S. 1, 8 (1988); Sec'y of State v. J.H. Munson Co.,
467 U.S. 947, 971 (1984) (Stevens, J., concurring); City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95,
113 (1983).
49. 490 U.S. 605 (1989).
50. Id. at 617.
51. The dissenting Justices, Rehnquist and Scalia, embrace this proposition with at least as
much fervor as the majority. See id. at 636 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
52. Id. at 621-22 (discussing a line of cases dating back to 1927).
53. Id. at 618.
54. Id.
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follows from the defendant's newfound course of appeal that state court
judgments in favor of non-Article III plaintiffs have collateral effect in
federal court. This important development greatly reduces the ex ante cost
of state-court/federal-law citizen suits. No longer need environmentalists
worry about relitigating state court victories before federal judges.
On occasion, too-clever defendants have tried to dodge the state court
claims of non-Article III plaintiffs by removing federal questions to federal
court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1441, and then moving for dismissal for want
of standing.55 They have been stymied every time: When federal courts lack
subject matter jurisdiction over a case removed under this section, they
must remand the matter to state court. 6
C. The Presumption of Concurrent Jurisdiction
1. Doctrine
The presumption that state courts have jurisdiction over federal claims
is well-established.57 The key question, then, is what Congress must specify
to overcome the presumption. Yellow Freight System, Inc. v. Donnelly,"
unanimously decided in 1990, moves forcefully toward a textual, clear-
statement requirement for exclusive federal jurisdiction. Preceding
decisions followed a three-part test that held the presumption rebuttable
55. See, e.g., Langford v. Gates, 610 F. Supp. 120 (C.D. Cal. 1985).
56. This follows from the mandatory language of 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c) (2000) (" If at any time
before final judgment it appears that the district court lacks subject matter jurisdiction, the case
shall be remanded." (emphasis added)). See Int'l Primate Prot. League v. Adm'rs of Tulane Educ.
Fund, 500 U.S. 72, 87-89 (1991) (deeming the district court's invocation of a "futility exception"
to justify dismissal rather than remand to contravene the plain language of § 1447(c)); cf Smith v.
Wis. Dep't of Agric., Trade & Consumer Prot., 23 F.3d 1134, 1142 (7th Cir. 1994) (noting that
§ 1447(c) requires remand, not dismissal, when a claim fails to pass Article III tests of ripeness or
standing); Me. Ass'n of Interdependent Neighborhoods v. Comm'r, Me. Dep't of Human Servs.,
876 F.2d 1051, 1053-55 (1st Cir. 1989) (same). Other cases remanded for lack of standing include
Wheeler v. Travelers Insurance Co., 22 F.3d 534 (3d Cir. 1994); Bradgate Associates, Inc. v.
Fellows, Read & Associates, Inc, 999 F.2d 745 (3d. Cir. 1993); Boyle v. MTV Networks, Inc., 766
F. Supp. 809 (N.D. Cal. 1991); and Martin v. General Motors, 753 F. Supp. 1347 (E.D. Mich.
1991). But see Cromwell v. Equicor-Equitable Corp., 944 F.2d 1272 (6th Cir. 1991) (stating that a
district court may evaluate preemption before standing, and dismiss rather than remand state-law
claims found to be preempted). The Cromwell concurrence and the dissent both reject this dubious
proposition. Id. at 1279 (Suhrheinrich, J., concurring); id. (Jones, J., dissenting). If it is defensible
at all (and I think it is not), Cromwell would turn on a distinction between constitutional Article
III standing and statutory standing (which may be more restrictive). The Cromwell court evaluated
standing on statutory grounds (ERISA) more restrictive than Article III, so perhaps the court did
not reach beyond its constitutional powers 'in evaluating preemption before standing. Still, the
ultimate decision to dismiss rather than remand the plaintiffs' claims violates the plain language
of § 1447(c).
57. E.g., Yellow Freight Sys., Inc. v. Donnelly, 494 U.S. 820 (1990) (Title VII); Tafflin v.
Levitt, 493 U.S. 455 (1990) (RICO); Gulf Offshore Co. v. Mobil Oil Corp., 453 U.S. 473 (1981)
(Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act).
58. 494 U.S. 820.
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"by an explicit statutory directive, by unmistakable implication from
legislative history, or by a clear incompatibility between state court
jurisdiction and federal interests." 9
Yellow Freight acknowledges compelling evidence of a congressional
"expectation" of exclusive federal jurisdiction over the law at issue, Title
VII,60 but holds that such an expectation, "even if universally shared, is not
an adequate substitute for a legislative decision to overcome the
presumption of concurrent jurisdiction." 6' The omission of "language that
expressly confines jurisdiction to federal courts or ousts state courts of their
presumptive jurisdiction.., is strong, and arguably sufficient, evidence that
Congress had no such intent." 6' Showing the weight of these words, the
Court refused to infer a dispositive congressional intent for exclusive
federal jurisdiction from statutory references to federal court procedures.63
Yellow Freight never mentions the three-part test for rebutting concurrent
jurisdiction, and while the decision includes a perfunctory incompatibility
analysis, it does not describe incompatibility as sufficient to deprive state
courts of jurisdiction.64 Indeed, Yellow Freight largely follows Justice
Scalia's concurrence in Tafflin v. Levitt,65 decided only months earlier.
Concurring in Tafflin, Justice Scalia wrote that legislative history never
suffices to break the presumption of concurrent jurisdiction.6 He further
proposed that "clear incompatibility" may not be adequate either,
observing that the cases usually cited to illustrate clear-incompatibility
analysis were decided on other grounds.67
2. Concurrent Jurisdiction in the Major Environmental Statutes
Yellow Freight would be immaterial for environmental plaintiffs if
federal environmental laws addressed state court jurisdiction expressly, but
it turns out that most of these statutes are mum on concurrent jurisdiction.
Generally they convey an impression of exclusive federal jurisdiction,
however, which has led to a number of faulty jurisdictional rulings in the
lower courts. In the pages that follow I show that a close reading of these
59. Gulf Offshore, 453 U.S. at 478 (citing cases dating back to 1876). Defining the federal
interest in exclusive jurisdiction for purposes of the third prong (incompatibility between state
court jurisdiction and federal interests), the Gulf Offshore Court points to "the desirability of
uniform interpretation, the expertise of federal judges in federal law, and the assumed greater
hospitality of federal courts to federal claims." Id. at 483-84.
60. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1982).
61. Yellow Freight, 494 U.S. at 824-25.
62. Id. at 823.
63. Id. at 825-26.
64. Id. at 826. (rejecting out of hand the experience and expertise arguments for exclusive
federal jurisdiction).
65. 493 U.S. 455 (1990).
66. Id. at 472 (Scalia, J., concurring).
67. Id. at 472-73.
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statutes in light of Yellow Freight suggests that all but CERCLA, 8 and
probably TSCA,69 accommodate state court jurisdiction.
Post-Yellow Freight, a statutory pronouncement that "each United
States district court ... shall have jurisdiction" does not deprive state
courts of concurrent jurisdiction." But many of the federal environmental
statutes treat jurisdiction and venue separately, and their venue clauses may
be thought to signify exclusive federal jurisdiction. Thus, for purposes of
jurisdictional analysis, I group the statutes according to their venue clauses.
The citizen-suit provisions of the Resources Conservation and Recovery
Act (RCRA),71 EPCRA,72 and TSCA73 present the hardest cases. These
commence with venue statements suggestive of exclusive federal
jurisdiction. Illumined by Yellow Freight, however, the RCRA and EPCRA
venue clauses seem not to deny concurrent jurisdiction.
The easiest cases are the Endangered Species Act (ESA),74 the Marine
Mammal Protection Act (MMPA)," and the Safe Drinking Water Act
(SDWA).76 These statutes have permissive venue clauses, or no venue
clause at all.
For a third group of statutes-the Clean Water Act (CWA),77 the Clean
Air Act (CAA),7" and the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act
(SMCRA) 9-the case for concurrent jurisdiction is strong, if not airtight.
Like the first group, these statutes have venue clauses that could be read to
signify exclusive federal jurisdiction. But here the placement and phrasing
of the venue clauses make the argument for exclusive federal jurisdiction
comparatively awkward.
I begin with RCRA, for here one finds the richest vein of case law. I
then present the other statutes in terms of the questions raised by RCRA. I
note the rare occasions on which state courts have issued opinions on
federal environmental laws,"0 and also the federal decisions that address
68. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (1994).
69. 15 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2692 (1994).
70. Yellow Freight Sys., Inc. v. Donnelly, 494 U.S. 820, 823 (1990).
71. 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6992.
72. Id. §§ 11001-11050.
73. 15 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2692.
74. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1544 (1994).
75. Id. §§ 1361-1407.
76. 42 U.S.C. §§ 300f-j.
77. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (1994).
78. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7642.
79. 30 U.S.C. §§ 1201-1328 (1994).
80. The Appendix tabulates these cases. My census may be slightly underinclusivc. For the
more commonly cited statutes (e.g., the CAA and the CWA), I ran Westlaw searches for state
court citations to the federal statute's citizen-suit provisions and for the term "citizen suit" in
conjunction with the name of the federal statute, rather than reviewing all of the many hundred
state court decisions that simply mention the federal statute by name. To confirm the validity of
this screen, I reviewed approximately 100 opinions from the more encompassing search (citation
to the statute by name), which confirmed that virtually all such cases do not involve citizen suits
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concurrent jurisdiction. In most of the state cases, the judge accepted
jurisdiction without discussion, or rejected jurisdiction on perfunctory
grounds. The painstaking doctrinal analysis offered here will, I hope, help
state judges better to understand their jurisdiction over federal
environmental claims.
a. Resources Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA), Emergency
Planning and Community Right-To-Know Act (EPCRA), and
Toxic Substances Control Act (TSCA)
Under the caption "In general" at the head of its citizen-suit clause,
RCRA specifies that suits "shall be brought in the district court for the
district in which the alleged violation occurred." 8 A sentence later the
statute explains that "[t]he district court shall have jurisdiction, without
regard to the amount in controversy or the citizenship of the parties" to
enforce the dictates of the law and to assess civil penalties.82 The venue
proposition suggests that Congress expects all RCRA claims to be brought
in a single system of trial courts, and the sentence that follows intimates
that that single system is the federal system.
Had Congress intended otherwise, it could have written that claims
under RCRA "shall be brought in the district [or trial] court of a district in
which the alleged violation occurred," or "may be brought in the district
court of the district in which the alleged violation occurred." Yet Congress
is not reliably precise in its use of the articles "the" and "a." Consider, for
instance, these paragraphs from the citizen-suit provision of the Outer
Continental Shelf Lands Act, the statute at issue in another concurrent
jurisdiction case, Gulf Offshore Co. v. Mobil Oil Corp.:83
(1) [T]he district courts of the United States shall have
jurisdiction .... Proceedings... may be instituted in the judicial
district in which any defendant resides or may be found, or in the
judicial district of the State nearest the place the cause of action
arose.
(2) Any resident of the United States who is injured... may bring
an action for damages ... only in the judicial district having
jurisdiction under [the above clause] .
pursuant to the federal statute (most involve disputes under analogous state laws). Still,
practitioners are advised not to assume that the cases tabulated in the Appendix fully exhaust the
universe of state-court citizen suits under federal environmental statutes.
81. 42 U.S.C. § 6972(a) (emphasis added).
82. Id.
83. 453 U.S. 473 (1981).
84. 43 U.S.C. § 1349(b)(l)-(b)(2) (1994) (emphasis added).
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The second paragraph is not semantically correct-Congress
mistakenly used the definite article "the" where it meant "a" -for it
follows from the first paragraph that multiple federal district courts can
have jurisdiction.
Judges should be wary of inferring substance from stray articles,
especially when the inference would contravene a legal norm (here,
concurrent jurisdiction) protected by clear-statement rules. In the aftermath
of Yellow Freight, inferences about congressional expectations do not
suffice to divest state courts of concurrent jurisdiction, even if those
inferences follow from the language of the statute itself. 85 RCRA's phrase,
"the district court for the judicial district in which the violation occurred,"
and the ensuing allusion to jurisdiction "without regard to the amount in
controversy," arguably show that Congress had the federal courts in mind,
but so do the prescriptions for federal appellate jurisdiction and the
references to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in Title VII and RICO,
which Yellow Freight and Tafflin respectively deem insufficient for
exclusive federal jurisdiction.
86
A quick glance at Title VII shows how far the Supreme Court will bend
plain meanings in the interest of concurrent jurisdiction. The statute
declares that "[a]ny temporary restraining order or other order granting
preliminary or temporary relief shall be issued in accordance with rule 65
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure."87 It makes no sense for Congress
to use the imperative "shall" unless Congress thinks that Title VII creates
exclusive federal jurisdiction. With regard to appellate jurisdiction, §
2000e-5(j) of Title VII specifies, "Any civil action brought under this
section... shall be subject to appeal as provided in sections 1291 and
1292, Title 28.""s Sections 1291 and 1292 of Title 28 establish the
jurisdiction of the federal circuit courts. If Title VII were read to reserve
exclusive jurisdiction to the federal courts, then § 2000e-5(j) would be a
correct statement. But if Title VII is read to confer concurrent jurisdiction
on the state courts-the Supreme Court's position in Yellow Freight-then
the word "shall" must be read as "may," or the words "in federal court"
must be inserted after "brought," for § 2000e-5(j) to be logically correct.
The Yellow Freight Court concluded that § 2000e-5() and § 2000e-5(f)(2)
come into play subsequent to a claim being brought in federal court.89 In
effect, then, the Court did read "brought" to mean "brought in federal
court." This seems a bigger interpretive leap than simply reading the "the"
85. See supra note 63 and accompanying text.
86. Yellow Freight Sys., Inc. v. Donnelly, 494 U.S. 820, 825-26 (1990); Tafflin v. Levitt, 493
U.S. 455, 466-67 (1990).
87. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(2) (1994) (emphasis added).
88. Id. § 2000e-5(j) (emphasis added).
89. Yellow Freight, 494 U.S. at 825-26.
[Vol. 110: 10031016
State Courts
in RCRA's venue language to mean "a," which is all that is required for
concurrent jurisdiction under that statute.
Note too that the "temporal" interpretive gloss that Yellow Freight uses
to avoid exclusive federal jurisdiction also would solve the venue problem
in RCRA. One could read RCRA's mandate that citizen suits "shall be
brought in the district court for the district in which the alleged violation
occurred" 90 as operating subsequent to the decision to bring a claim in state
or federal court. Once you have chosen a judicial system, then you must
bring your claims in the district court for the judicial district in which the
alleged violation occurred. This gloss on RCRA's venue language is
considerably less heroic than Yellow Freight's analogous interpretation of
the federal court procedure clauses of Title VII.91 Yellow Freight renders
nugatory two clauses of Title VII as regards state court claims, whereas my
reading of RCRA's venue provision allows it to operate vis-A-vis state and
federal courts.
Only one court has wrestled with concurrent jurisdiction under RCRA
in light of the Supreme Court's decision in Yellow Freight. In Davis v. Sun
Oil Co., the Sixth Circuit held RCRA not to preempt state court
jurisdiction. The court observed that Yellow Freight rejects an argument for
exclusive federal jurisdiction premised on this language from Title VII:
"Each United States district court. . . shall have jurisdiction under this
subchapter."9 3 It follows that RCRA's "shall be brought" phrase does not
divest state courts of jurisdiction. Though the end result seems correct, the
reasoning is doubtful. No implications about state court jurisdiction follow
as a matter of logical necessity from the above-quoted Title VII clause,94
whereas the RCRA citizen-suit provision, if read literally, affirmatively
requires citizens to bring their claim in one particular and presumably
federal court (the district court for the judicial district in which the alleged
violation occurred). Sun Oil fails to canvass any of the rationales for
concurrent jurisdiction under RCRA set forth in this Note.
Davis v. Sun Oil represents a minority viewpoint among judicial
opinions that consider state court jurisdiction under RCRA. In Middlesex
90. 42 U.S.C. § 6972(a) (emphasis added).
91. One can imagine a contrary though ultimately unconvincing view. The contrarian's
argument runs thus: The references to federal procedure and federal appellate jurisdiction in Title
VII, and that statute's jurisdictional provisions, are found in different clauses. By contrast, RCRA
wraps venue and jurisdiction into the same paragraph, and both the venue and the jurisdiction
statements use "district court" to refer to the same, particular entity (which, by the jurisdiction
statement, seems to be a federal court). This position is not nonsense, but when there exist two
plausible statutory interpretations, one admitting and the other denying state court jurisdiction, the
norms of Yellow Freight militate in favor of the one compatible with concurrent jurisdiction.
92. 148 F.3d 606 (6th Cir. 1998).
93. Id. at 612 (quoting Yellow Freight, 494 U.S. at 823).
94. From "If X is a federal court, then X shall have jurisdiction," it does not necessarily
follow that, "If X is not a federal court, then X shall not have jurisdiction."
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County Board of Chosen Freeholders v. New Jersey," which predates
Yellow Freight, the federal district court relied on the "shall be brought"
phrase, scant legislative history, and a statutory reference to the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure to establish exclusive federal jurisdiction over
RCRA claims. (The second and third arguments are no longer good in light
of Yellow Freight.) The argument of Middlesex County is rehashed
approvingly by the Eighth Circuit in Blue Legs v. Bureau of Indian Affairs
96
(which predates Yellow Freight), and by Colorado's intermediate appellate
court in Jilot v. State97 (which postdates but does not cite Yellow Freight).
Three post-Yellow Freight decisions from trial courts also treat the "shall"
phrase as sufficient to establish exclusive federal jurisdiction.98 But these
perfunctory rulings carry no precedential value-none of the parties argued
for concurrent jurisdiction, and the rulings are bereft of any authority or
explanation beyond the bare terms of the RCRA citizen-suit clause.
In sum, neither the text of RCRA nor the emerging body of case law
provides a secure basis for predicting future decisions on concurrent
jurisdiction. Yet the force of the concurrent jurisdiction presumption calls
for state court jurisdiction under RCRA, a point lost on the few judges who
have considered this issue since the Supreme Court's decision in Yellow
Freight.
The citizen-suit clause of RCRA has close cousins in EPCRA99 and
TSCA.lm EPCRA's phrasing of venue precisely mimics RCRA's,"1° and
thus raises the same host of questions. Still, the case for concurrent
jurisdiction under EPCRA may be marginally stronger than the equivalent
claim for RCRA. Right after its perplexing venue requirement, RCRA
indicates that "the district court shall have jurisdiction, without regard to
the amount in controversy or the citizenship of the parties," 0 2 suggesting,
perhaps, that RCRA's venue clause refers only to federal courts. By
contrast, EPCRA's jurisdiction clause makes no allusion to federal question
95. 645 F. Supp. 715, 719-20 (D.N.J. 1986).
96. 867 F.2d 1094, 1098 (8th Cir. 1989).
97. 944 P.2d 566, 568-69 (Colo. Ct. App. 1996).
98. White & Brewer Trucking, Inc. v. Donley, 952 F. Supp. 1306 (C.D. Ill. 1997); Grand E.
Props. v. Phillips, No. CV 940364608, 1996 WL 151229 (Conn. Super. Ct. Mar. 4, 1996);
Andrews v. Caron Bros., No. 45136, 1992 WL 67396 (Conn. Super. Ct. Mar. 26, 1992).
99. 42 U.S.C. § 11046(b)(1) (1994) ("Any action... against an owner or operator of a
facility shall be brought in the district court for the district in which the alleged violation
occurred." (emphasis added)).
100. 15 U.S.C. § 2619(a) (1994) (stating that citizen suits "shall be brought in the United
States district court for the district in which the alleged violation occurred." (emphasis added)).
101. Both statutes specify that citizen suits against private violators "shall be brought in the
district court for the district in which the alleged violation occurred." RCRA, 42 U.S.C.
§ 6972(a); EPCRA, id. § 11046(b)(1) (1994).
102. 42 U.S.C. § 6972(a) (emphasis added).
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jurisdiction, and thus does not intimate that "district court" as used in the
venue/jurisdiction section means U.S. district court." 3
TSCA, by contrast, expressly attaches the modifier "United States" to
"district court." "0 In stating that citizen suits "shall be brought in the
United States district court for the district in which the alleged violation
occurred," 1"5 TSCA resolves the ambiguity in RCRA and comes as close as
a statute can to reserving jurisdiction expressly to the federal courts without
use of the phrase "exclusive jurisdiction." To find that TSCA confers state
court jurisdiction, one would have to abandon plain meanings altogether,
massaging the word "shall" until it acquires the shape of "may."
No court has addressed the question of concurrent jurisdiction under
EPCRA; only once has the issue come up under TSCA.' °6 As one would
expect, that court endorsed exclusive federal jurisdiction. But the ruling is
precedentially inconsequential, for the question of concurrent jurisdiction
was not argued before the court, and the decision is justified with only a
passing reference to the statute.
b. Endangered Species Act (ESA), Marine Mammal Protection
Act (MMPA), and Safe Drinking Water Act (SDWA)
No defensible reading of these statutes could strip the state courts of
concurrent jurisdiction. The citizen-suit provision of the ESA indicates that
"[d]istrict courts shall have jurisdiction, without regard to the amount in
controversy or the citizenship of the parties." 1"7 The statute also specifies
that "any suit under this subsection may be brought in the judicial district in
which the violation occurs." 108 It follows from Congress's use of the
permissive "may," rather than the mandatory "shall," that the ESA venue
clause does not dislodge state court jurisdiction. This reasoning won the
Supreme Court's approval in Tafflin V. Levitt."°
The SDWA specifies that the "United States district courts shall have
jurisdiction" ;10 this is precisely the jurisdictional formulation of Title VII,
which the Supreme Court in Yellow Freight deemed inadequate to divest
state courts of concurrent jurisdiction."' The MMPA features an innocuous
103. Id. § 11046(c).
104. 15 U.S.C. § 2619(a).
105. Id.
106. Andrews v. Caron Bros., No. 45136, 1992 WL 67396 (Conn. Super. Ct. Mar. 26, 1992).
107. 16 U.S.c § 1540(g)(1) (1994).
108. Id. § 1540(g)(3)(A) (emphasis added).
109. 493 U.S. 455, 460-61 (1990) (finding concurrent jurisdiction under RICO).
110. 42 U.S.C. § 300j-8 (1994).
111. Yellow Freight Sys., Inc. v. Donnelly, 494 U.S. 820, 823 (1990).
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authorization of district court jurisdiction much like the ESA's.t"2 Neither
the MMPA nor the SDWA includes a venue clause.
On only four occasions have state courts confronted claims under these
statutes. None of the decisions sheds much light on concurrent jurisdiction.
In one case, the state court assumed jurisdiction without question or
analysis;"' in another, the state court abstained because the claim
implicated a federal agency;"' and in the others, the courts perfunctorily
and incorrectly deemed federal jurisdiction exclusive."l
c. Clean Water Act (CWA), Clean Air Act (CAA), and Surface
Mining Control and Reclamation Act (SMCRA)
Like the statutes just discussed, the CWA, the CAA, and SMCRA have
innocuous "jurisdiction" clauses that grant federal courts authority to hear
citizen suits while remaining silent, expressly and by implication, on the
question of exclusivity.' 6 But these statutes also have distinct "venue"
provisions that might appear to oust state courts of jurisdiction. So, for
instance, the venue clause of the CWA specifies that actions "may be
brought ... only in the judicial district [in which the polluting source is
located]."'1 7 Again, the article "the" denotes a single system of disjunct
judicial districts, that is, the federal courts. Had Congress planned for
concurrent jurisdiction, the semantically correct formulation of the venue
clause would have been: "[A]ctions may be brought ... only in a judicial
district [in which the polluting source is located]."
112. 33 U.S.C. § 1415(g)(1) (1994) ("The district courts shall have jurisdiction ... to enforce
such prohibition, limitation, criterion, or permit [as is provided by the act]." ).
113. Hammond v. N. Slope Borough, 645 P.2d 750 (Alaska 1982) (resolving ESA and
MMPA claims by importing the decision of a federal judge in parallel litigation).
114. San Bernardino Valley Audubon Soc'y v. Metro. Water Dist., 83 Cal. Rptr. 2d 836 (Ct.
App. 1999) (discussing the fact that the plaintiff contested the adequacy of an Incidental Take
Permit issued by the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, an issue deemed inappropriate for state court
resolution).
115. See Prairie Dog Advocates v. City of Lakewood, No. 98CA2396, 2000 WL 674879
(Colo. Ct. App. May 25, 2000) (ESA); Andrews v. Caron Bros., No. 45136, 1992 WL 67396
(Conn. Super. Ct. Mar. 26, 1992) (SDWA). Caron Bros. is worthless as precedent: Both the
plaintiff and the defendant conceded exclusive federal jurisdiction, and the court made only the
most superficial of inquiries into the matter, failing even to appreciate the difference between the
SDWA's plain vanilla authorization of federal jurisdiction and TSCA's decree that citizen suits
"shall be brought" in federal district court. Caron Bros., 1992 WL 67396, at *3-4. Prairie Dog
Advocates is no more respectable, stating in one brief sentence that the ESA establishes exclusive
federal jurisdiction. Prairie Dog Advocates, 2000 WL 674879, at *3.
116. The CWA provides: "[D]istrict courts shall have jurisdiction... to enforce.., an
effluent standard or limitation .... " 33 U.S.C. § 1365(a). The CAA uses the same phrase, 42
U.S.C. § 7604(a) (1994), and SMCRA also states that "district courts shall have jurisdiction," 30
U.S.C. § 1270(a) (1994).
117. 33 U.S.C. § 1365(c)(1) (emphasis added). The analogous venue provisions of the CAA
and SMCRA are found, respectively, at 42 U.S.C. § 7604(c)(1) and 30 U.S.C. § 1270(c)(1).
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Thus the CWA, the CAA, and SMCRA seem to recapitulate the puzzle
seen earlier in the citizen-suit provisions of RCRA and EPCRA. And the
reasons for finding concurrent jurisdiction under those statutes apply
equally to the CWA, the CAA, and SMCRA. Here, though, the case for
concurrent jurisdiction is stronger yet. These statutes provide for
jurisdiction and venue in separate clauses, with venue coming later in the
statutory scheme, much as RICO and Title VII provide separately for
jurisdiction and federal court procedures."l 8 The Supreme Court treated the
RICO and Title VII provisions as operating subsequent to the decision to
bring a claim in federal court; similarly, judges should read the venue
provisions of the CWA, the CAA, and SMCRA as operating subsequent to
the choice between state and federal judiciaries. This analogy was plausible
enough in the context of RCRA and EPCRA; it is even better here, where
the "layout" of the jurisdiction and venue clauses precisely mirrors the
layout of the jurisdiction and federal court procedure clauses in Title VII.
Furthermore, the venue clauses of the CWA, the CAA, and SMCRA
specify that actions be brought only in "the judicial district" in which the
alleged violation occurred, whereas the venue language of RCRA and
EPCRA requires that actions be brought in "the district court for the
judicial district" in which the alleged violation took place. This is but a
hair-splitting distinction; still, one might think the reference to "district
court" in RCRA and EPCRA means "federal district court," whereas the
use of "judicial districts" in the CWA, the CAA, and SMCRA reflects only
the typical venue concern of making the place of trial convenient to the
defendant.'
No court has applied the Supreme Court's concurrent-jurisdiction
jurisprudence to citizen suits brought under the CAA, the CWA, or
SMCRA, though state courts have thrice confronted claims under the CWA
and once considered a SMCRA petition. 2
118. This obviates the contrarian's reply to my argument for concurrent jurisdiction under
EPCRA and RCRA. See supra note 91.
119. But Black defines the secondary usage of "district court" thus: "The name for inferior
state courts of record having general jurisdiction." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 476 (6th ed.
1990).
120. In Berens v. Cook, 694 N.Y.S.2d 684 (App. Div. 1999), the New York court did not
question or otherwise address the propriety of state court adjudication of CWA citizen suits. The
same is true for Puget Soundkeeper Alliance v. State, 9 P.3d 892 (Wash. Ct. App. 2000). In Kerns
v. Dukes, 707 A.2d 363 (Del. 1998), the Delaware Supreme Court affirmed state court jurisdiction
over the CWA, but, strangely, neither Yellow Freight nor its antecedents figured into the court's
reasoning. Instead, the finding of concurrent jurisdiction turned on the competence of Delaware
courts to grant the relief called for by the CWA. Id. at 369-70. This line of thinking echoes the"clear incompatibility" test for ousting state courts of jurisdiction. The only SMCRA claim to
appear before state courts arises in Castle Valley Special Service District v. Utah Board of Oil,
Gas, & Mining, 938 P.2d 248 (Utah 1996). It does not address the jurisdictional question.
2001] 1021
The Yale Law Journal
3. Cooperative Federalism as an Alternative to Concurrent
Jurisdiction?
Most of the major environmental statutes authorize state agencies to
assume control over implementation if the state legislature enacts a
corresponding statute at least as stringent as the federal law, and the state
agency demonstrates its competence and diligence to the satisfaction of the
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency. 2 ' One might think, then, that
citizen suits in state court would be brought pursuant to the state analogue
of the federal law, rather than the federal law itself. It is certainly true that
citizens often turn to state courts with gripes about state environmental
agencies' implementation of the state versions of the federal statutes."'2 It is
not true, however, that cooperative federalism renders concurrent
jurisdiction irrelevant, or that cooperative federalism seems a likely
explanation for the paucity of federal-law citizen suits litigated in state
courts by environmentalists.
As to the first matter-irrelevance-the degree to which states have
assumed responsibility for implementing federal environmental law varies
from state to state and from federal statute to federal statute. Direct
enforcement of federal law is needed to fill the gaps. One important gap
may be claims against private parties-my search for recent citizen suits
pursuant to state laws that incorporate federal requirements turned up no
such claims.2 3 As to the second issue, few state court claims have been
brought under any of the federal environmental statutes; there is no
discernable concentration of federal-law/state-court claims under those
121. 16 U.S.C. § 1379 (1994) (authorizing the transfer of management responsibilities to the
states under the MMPA); id. § 1535 (authorizing cooperative agreements under the ESA);
30 U.S.C. § 1253 (authorizing state implementation under SMCRA); 33 U.S.C. § 1342(b)
(authorizing state implementation of National Point Source Discharge Elimination System permits
under the CWA); 42 U.S.C. § 300g-2 (allocating primary enforcement responsibility to the state
regarding public water systems during any period for which the EPA administrator determines
that the state has adopted and is implementing regulations no less strict than those in the SDWA);
id. § 6926 (authorizing state implementation of hazardous waste management under RCRA); id.
§ 7410 (authorizing "state implementation plans" to enforce national air-quality standards under
the CAA).
122. For recent examples, see In re BASF Corp.'s EXemption Permit from Hazardous Waste
Land Disposal Restrictions, 765 So. 2d 1171, 1176 (La. Ct. App. 2000), which addresses a state
law that incorporates portions of the federal SDWA; Friends of Ottawa River v. Schregardus, No.
98AP-1314, 1999 WL 717314 (Ohio Ct. App. Sept. 16, 1999), which addresses claims under a
state law implementing the federal CWA; New York Public Interest Research Group, Inc. v. New
York State Department of Environmental Conservation, 710 N.Y.S.2d 521 (Sup. Ct. 2000), which
addresses state implementation of the federal CAA; and Bowers v. Pollution Control Hearing
Board, 13 P.3d 1076 (Wash. Ct. App. 2000), which addresses state laws that incorporate standards
from the federal CAA.
123. This was only a superficial search, encompassing only air- and water-quality cases
decided in the last eighteen months. I have not undertaken the mind-numbing task of sifting
through the universe of environmental claims under state law to ascertain fully the "indirect"
reach of federal environmental law. For claims against state defendants, see supra note 122.
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statutes that do not allow for state implementation, or that in practice leave
the states with minimal roles. 24
IV. NORMATIVE CONSIDERATIONS: DEFENDING THE STATUS QUO
This Part defends the Supreme Court's current practice of allowing
state courts to hear federal claims from non-Article III plaintiffs. Defending
the status quo might seem an uninteresting project. It becomes intriguing,
however, when one realizes that the sparse legal scholarship on state court
standing for federal law claimants almost universally supports the contrary
position.'25 The level of interest grows further when one ventures, as I do in
this Note, into the underexplored terrain that connects the separation-of-
powers interpretation of standing to ASARCO and its antecedents.
Moreover, the doctrinal status quo may come under pressure if the
practice of environmental lawyering changes in line with the predictions of
this Note. It is no secret that a wing of the Rehnquist Court disdains the
"public interest" bar. ASARCO is a short, conclusory decision, which exists
in tension with some of its antecedents.' 26 Its durability may depend on a
rationale more compelling than the one furnished by the Court.27
This Part divides the case for imposing Article III on state courts (when
they hear federal claims) into three kinds of arguments: a prophylactic
defense of the separation of powers; a policy argument; and an argument
for improved consistency across "the legal landscape." I proceed to show
that separation-of-powers concerns do not undercut ASARCO; that policy
arguments grounded in the constitutional text favor the ASARCO rule; and
that ASARCO comports nicely with the contemporary legal landscape.
A. Introduction: Answering ASARCO's Critics
Scholarly commentary on state courts, federal claims, and Article III
dates back to Professor Freund's suggestion in the wake of Doremus that
the standing of state court plaintiffs with federal claims be treated as a
124. TSCA and EPCRA do not provide for state implementation (but note that TSCA may
not accommodate concurrent jurisdiction, either). The ESA and the MMPA are administered
almost entirely by federal agencies; the Clean Water and Clean Air Acts place the states on the
front lines. Yet state court claims under the ESA and the MMPA do not seem any more common
than state court claims under the CWA and the CAA. See Appendix.
125. The sole exception is Brian A. Stem, Note, An Argument Against Imposing the Federal
"Case or Controversy" Requirement on State Courts, 69 N.Y.U. L. REV. 77 (1994). The
footnotes in my Note track the points of congruence between his argument and mine, and also the
weaknesses in his argument that I claim to solve.
126. See cases cited supra note 47.
127. For the Court's rationale, see supra text accompanying notes 49-51.
2001] 1023
The Yale Law Journal
federal question. 12 This suggestion would eliminate the possibility of
unreviewable state court interpretations of federal law, a possibility perhaps
incompatible with the Supremacy Clause. Subsequent commentators
embraced Freund's position; 2 9 the most thoughtful and nuanced exposition
came from then-Professor (now Judge) Fletcher. 3 '
Critiques of ASARCO operate on three levels. There is an argument for
institutional formalism, an argument about policy, and an argument from
the legal landscape. By "institutional formalism," I mean the view of some
commentators and jurists that the Constitution should be read to protect
absolutely a core domain for each instrumentality of governance.
Institutional formalism is a trump card. If the Supremacy Clause means that
the Supreme Court must have appellate jurisdiction over every federal
question decided in state court, or, equivalently, that in no circumstance
may a non-Article III plaintiff raise a federal question, then our inquiry is
over, and ASARCO was wrongly decided.
The pages to come describe sympathetically the case for institutional
formalism in constitutional law. I contend, however, that state court
adjudication of non-Article III plaintiffs' federal claims does not generate
the kind of ailment appropriately remedied with institutional formalism.
This question resolved, I examine the policy considerations that undergird
the Supremacy Clause, and then survey the legal landscape. Both exercises
reinforce the ASARCO rule.
B. Formalism in Structural Constitutional Law
Out of the receding floodwaters of the New Deal and Second
Reconstruction, the Rehnquist Court has dredged up and re-enlivened a
structural Constitution. Theirs is a Constitution that separates powers
among the executive branch, the legislative branch, and the federal courts;
that reserves certain rights and privileges to the several states; and that
withholds from Congress the general police power. Commentators divide
the Court's separation-of-powers jurisprudence into formal and functional
strands, a taxonomy that well serves the aims of this Note. Formalists
would separate the branches of government with sharp, role-distinguishing
128. SUPREME COURT AND SUPREME LAW 35 (Edmond Cahn ed., 1955) (remarks of
Professor Paul Freund).
129. See generally Fletcher, supra note 45; William P. Murphy, Supreme Court Review of
Abstract State Court Decisions on Federal Law: A Justiciability Analysis, 25 ST. Louis U. L.J.
473 (198 1); Jonathan D. Varat, Variable Justiciability and the Duke Power Case, 58 TEX. L. REv.
273, 311-13 (1980).
130. Fletcher, supra note 45.
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doctrines;' functionalists prefer flexible standards that-they hope-
substantially maintain certain (admittedly fuzzy) core functions and
relations. 312 Formalist separation-of-powers jurisprudence is "formal" in
two senses. First, it is institutionally formal, favoring a kind of role-specific
rigidity in the functions of each branch of government. Second, it imposes
these distinctions with rule-based doctrines ("doctrinal formalism") that
admit of very little judicial discretion.'33
Functionalists decry separation-of-powers formalism as a gawky
hindrance to experimenting with new models of democratic governance, in
line with emerging pressures and sentiments. 3 4 "Pragmatic" formalists
demur, then lay claim to the lesser of evils.'35 Theirs is foremost a
prudential thesis: that the threat to governmental efficiency and innovation
posed by formalism pales in comparison to the risk that jurists applying the
ad hoc balancing tests of functionalism would fail to block the incremental
but (eventually) tyrannical accumulation of power in one branch.'36 Policing
the arrogation of power to one branch at the expense of another is at once
too indefinite and too politically charged a task for judges to execute using
anything but bright-line rules-rules that corral judicial discretion, rules to
which judges, public officials, and citizens alike become so inured that their
use in a time of crisis would be second-nature.
Formalist and functionalist thinking also figure into the federalism
debates, but with an altogether different cast. Self-professed formalists like
Justice Scalia carry the standard for the states'-rights movement, yet
the formalism of their new doctrines is extraordinarily confined. Only
where federalism implicates the separation of powers has the Supreme
Court issued an arguably formalist ruling that Congress cannot
circumambulate.'37 The other formalist rulings-the anticommandeering 3 8
131. In my view the most compelling defense of formalism is Martin H. Redish & Elizabeth
J. Cisar, "If Angels Were To Govern": The Need for Pragmatic Formalism in Separation of
Powers Theory, 1991 DUKE L.J. 449.
132. A classic exposition of the functionalist position is Peter L. Strauss, The Place of
Agencies in Government: Separation of Powers and the Fourth Branch, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 573
(1984).
133. The' comparative advantages of "rules" and "standards" occupy most debates about
formalism and functionalism in law. See, e.g., Larry Alexander, "With Me, It's All er Nuthin'":
Formalism in Law and Morality, 66 U. CHi. L. REv. 530 (1999).
134. E.g., E. Donald Elliott, Why Our Separation of Powers Jurisprudence Is So Abysmal, 57
GEO. WASH. L. REv. 506, 509-13 (1989) (bemoaning rigid separation-of-powers jurisprudence
that stymies governmental innovation).
135. The concept of "pragmatic formalism" is developed in Redish & Cisar, supra note 131,
at 476. Redish and Cisar differentiate between (good) "pragmatic" formalism, motivated
consequentially, and (bad, or at least false) "epistemological formalism," motivated by a
philosophic commitment to the categorical interpretation of texts. Id. at 453-54.
136. Id. at 454.
137. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 535-36 (1997) (holding that Congress's effort to
reinstate by legislation the Court's earlier and more expansive view of free-exercise rights under
the Fourteenth Amendment transgresses the separation of powers and that the definition of
Fourteenth Amendment is the province of the judiciary, not the legislature).
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and sovereign immunity39 cases-are basically expressive. 4 ' Congress can
get around them by using the spending power or the threat of preemption to
induce the states to submit to its will.
Standards also take precedence over rules as the Court fiddles with
limits to congressional power under the Commerce Clause. Twice in the
last five years has the Court struck down laws enacted (nominally) pursuant
to the Commerce Clause,14 1 closing a sixty-year run of unequivocal,
"rational basis" deference to Commerce Clause legislation.'42 But these
cases do not resuscitate the troubled, pre-New Deal categorical distinctions
between proper and improper objects of legislation under the Commerce
Clause. Rather, they turn on the vaguest of standards: whether the target of
the law at issue "substantially affects" interstate commerce. That political
considerations figured into these rulings is obvious. Both decisions struck
down recently enacted legislation, long before the laws could become
ingrained in American life. Open-ended standards enable and call forth
politically sensitized decisions.
The federalism cases reinforce Redish and Cisar's belief that the
Court's power to backtrack is very constrained once the Court has allowed
a structural change in American governance. The Court is not powerless,
but its power is largely one of signaling or reinforcing ideas, and tracking
political movements, rather than braking runaway trains. Fixing the status
quo in place with institutional formalism may be within the judicial
competence; unilaterally undoing the status quo is not.
C. The Supremacy Clause and the Separation of Powers
Back to the Supremacy Clause. The task at hand is to decide whether
this Clause should be read to permit state court adjudication of federal
claims brought by non-Article III plaintiffs. The leading choices are both
doctrinally formal; they assume the guise of clear-cut rules. ASARCO
138. Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997) (holding that Congress may not require
state and local government officials to execute federal law); New York v. United States, 505 U.S.
144 (1992) (holding that Congress may not require state legislatures to enact congressionally
specified legislation).
139. Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706 (1999) (holding that Congress cannot abrogate state
sovereign immunity against private suits in state court); Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44
(1996) (holding that Congress cannot abrogate state sovereign immunity against private suits in
federal court).
140. Cf Elizabeth S. Anderson & Richard H. Pildes, Expressive Theories of Law: A General
Restatement, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 1504, 1556-64 (2000) (arguing that expressive theory better
explains the anticommandeering rule than does consequentialist theory).
141. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000) (striking down the civil-remedy
provision of the Violence Against Women Act); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995)
(striking down a portion of the Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990).
142. The deferential stance began with NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1
(1937), in the wake of Franklin Roosevelt's court-packing threat.
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always permits state courts to apply their lenient, home-grown rules of
justiciability to federal claims. The Freund-Fletcher alternative would never
permit deviations from Article III for federal questions. Neither approach
will yield maybe-yes/maybe-no cases that require discernment and
balancing. This is appropriate. There are no common practices of
governance to be unsettled, as in the federalism setting, nor are there
sensitive, individualized questions of justice that evoke equitable
sensibilities. Simple rules will serve just fine.
Though ASARCO and the Freund-Fletcher alternative are both
doctrinally formal, only the latter is institutionally formal, in the sense that
it protects without qualification the Supreme Court's ability to review all
lower court decisions on federal questions. This sharp demarcation of the
role of the Court echoes the thinking of separation-of-powers formalists.
ASARCO, by contrast, makes a minor intrusion on the Supreme Court's
customary domain. But is there a looming threat that must be warded off
with the Freund-Fletcher prophylaxis? To pose the question seems almost
laughable.
ASARCO does not position state courts to usurp federal law. It traverses
no slippery slope bereft of doctrinal toeholds. The "threat" to federal law,
if that is the term for it, is that state courts will interpret federal law too
narrowly.'4 3 Improperly broad interpretations would only arise in the setting
of a plaintiff victory, which by ASARCO amounts to an injury in fact to the
defendant, allowing the Supreme Court to hear the case on appeal. Public-
interest groups would surely answer unduly narrow interpretations by
soliciting Article III plaintiffs to challenge the same law in federal court,
giving the federal judiciary a chance to correct the state court's mistake.1"
In exceptional cases, no Article III plaintiffs may exist. Here, though, a U.S.
Attorney presumably could step in with a federal court enforcement
action.'45 Congress could respond, too, by stripping the state courts of
jurisdiction over federal claims,' or by amending citizen-suit provisions to
require Article HI standing. All three branches of the federal government
143. Improperly broad interpretations would only arise in the setting of a plaintiff victory,
which by ASARCO amounts to an injury in fact to the defendant, so the Supreme Court could hear
the case on appeal.
144. As a matter of comity, state courts then would defer to the federal interpretation, just as
federal courts defer to state court interpretations of state law in diversity cases.
145. But this raises an interesting question: Would the federal courts be overstepping their
Article III bounds by hearing a case, brought by a U.S. Attorney, in which no private citizen has
suffered an injury in fact? I think the answer is context-specific. Certainly the public attorney may
no more seek an advisory opinion than her private counterpart. But in most environmental
enforcement actions the government has a tangible interest-civil penalties owed to the
Treasury-that private parties lack. Beyond penalties, the government has interests by virtue of its
property holdings (for example, public lands, conservation easements) and contractual positions
(for example, habitat conservation plans under the Endangered Species Act) that private parties
lack.
146. Brian Stern also makes this point. Stern, supra note 125, at 96.
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share an interest in the supremacy of federal law. Together they can rebuff
any state court that improperly restricts federal law. Not only does this
coincidence of interest lessen the utility of the Freund-Fletcher rule, it also
means the Supreme Court could backtrack and overturn ASARCO with only
a modicum of trauma, especially if ASARCO is seen to hang on a contingent
understanding of consequences. 147 State courts might be resentful, but the
Supreme Court's move would not risk a constitutional crisis-unlike, say,
the Court's reversal of a previously approved usurpation by one of the
coordinate branches. Prophylactic formalism is of little moment.
Or is it? All three branches do share a common interest in the
supremacy of federal law, if supremacy is understood to mean uniform and
faithful interpretations, or precedence over conflicting state and local laws.
But the three branches may not agree on the desirability of enforcement
actions brought by citizens who lack Article III standing. Justice Scalia, for
one, maintains that citizen suits brought by plaintiffs who have not suffered
a concrete, redressable injury--one that separates them out from the general
public-violate the separation of powers. 48 Others share his view that
standing has something to do with the separation of powers, but few have
limned the connection so precisely.'49
Scalia asserts that suits by "uninjured" or "ideological" plaintiffs
disrupt the constitutionally prescribed distribution of powers in three ways.
First, they shift the timing of judicial action. 5 Issues that might have been
resolved through the elected branches get pressed on the courts
immediately, forcing the courts to speak while political fires bum hot.
Second, ideological suits bring to the courts' attention matters that properly
belong to the elected branches. 5' Quite simply, statutes and constitutional
clauses that neither create nor prevent concrete, individualized harms do not
belong in the courts. Third, these suits supplant "the Chief Executive's
most important constitutional duty," namely, to "'take Care that the Laws
be faithfully executed."152 Were Congress positioned to empower "any
citizen" to enforce its laws, Congress could usurp a central element of the
executive's Article II prerogatives. Justice Scalia has always presented his
147. See infra Section IV.D for one such explanation of ASARCO.
148. Antonin Scalia, The Doctrine of Standing as an Essential Element of the Separation of
Powers, 17 SUFFOLK U. L. REv. 881, 891 (1983).
149. For example, Judge Fletcher's cryptic assertion that the case-or-controversy requirement
is a "valuable, even indispensable" limitation on the judicial power suggests a latent concern for
the separation of powers. See Fletcher, supra note 45, at 283.
150. Scalia, supra note 148, at 892.
151. Id.
152. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 577 (1992) (quoting U.S. CONST. art. II,
§ 3); cf. Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs., Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 209-10 (Scalia, J.,




analysis in terms of the federal courts, yet it would seem to apply just as
forcefully to the adjudication of federal claims in state courts.
Recall my purpose in wandering down the separation-of-powers lane:
to detect a threat, a trace of creeping tyranny, that might justify the
prophylactic, "pragmatic formalism" of Professors Redish and Cisar, 53
which in turn might justify the institutional formalism of the Freund-
Fletcher rule. So motivated, I need concern myself only with Justice
Scalia's charge that lenient standing allows Congress to usurp the
executive's Article I1 duties. It is hard to see incidental changes in the
timing of judicial decisions (Scalia's first complaint) as an encroachment on
or suppression of one of the coordinate branches. A quick turnaround from
the courts may affect the tenor of politics and the modes of political
expression, but it does not deprive the judicial branch of any powers or
accrete judicial responsibilities to the legislative or executive domains. If
the implication of standing for the timing of judicial decisions is a
separation-of-powers concern at all, it belongs to a different genus than do
the encroachments and suppressions properly warded off with a prophylaxis
of formalism.
Justice Scalia's second quibble with liberalized standing-that it
presents the courts with issues the executive and legislative branches should
decide--collapses into his first and third concerns. If a statute creates no
material injuries to private persons, and injury in fact is requisite to
standing, it does not follow that the courts will never adjudicate a challenge
to the statute. The state remains a prospective plaintiff. The absence of
citizen plaintiffs would make a challenge less likely (changing the timing of
judicial action) and would let the attorney general nurse a statute into
desuetude (an Article H prerogative?), but the lack of citizen plaintiffs
would not categorically exclude judicial resolution of the issue.
I have pared Justice Scalia's separation-of-powers theory down to
a single issue-the executive's Article II prerogatives-that may call for
the Freund-Fletcher rule on grounds of pragmatic formalism. To Article II
I now turn.
Justice Scalia's theory of congressional usurpation (of executive duties)
via citizen suits turns on probabilities and political accountability. It is an
almost certain bet that for any statute Congress enacts, someone-
accountable to no one-is chomping at the bit to enforce it. Absent an
injury-causation-redressability requirement for standing, Congress could
shunt these activists into court and get immediate declaratory judgments,
which the rule against advisory opinions bars Congress from obtaining for
itself. Not so if the activist must bring her claim before state courts.
Congress wields no control over jurisdiction there. All Congress can do is
153. See supra note 135.
10292001]
The Yale Law Journal
authorize state-court citizen suits by non-Article III plaintiffs. Whether the
would-be private attorney general actually gets into court depends on
jurisdictional rules adopted by courts and legislatures accountable to state
electorates. 54 This is no slippery slope toward tyranny. The Court may need
pragmatic formalism in its separation-of-powers jurisprudence to guard
against the arrogation of power to a single branch, but there is not the
remotest threat of incipient tyranny in congressional actions that displace
power to democratically accountable state institutions.'55 Quite the contrary:
This discharge of federal executive powers enhances the diffusion of
authority, adding a "vertical" separation (between the national government
and the states) to the "horizontal" division of powers among Congress, the
executive branch, and the federal courts.
To my mind, the fact that state-court citizen suits by non-Article III
plaintiffs do not effect a congressional usurpation of executive power
eliminates the separation-of-powers concern. Others may not be satisfied,
though, because the executive's prosecutorial prerogatives remain
unprotected. 56 Redish and Cisar, for instance, would guard against any
diminishment of a branch's powers, even if the powers removed from or
restricted within that branch are not assumed by another. 57 But there is a
problem with imposing Article III on state courts in the interest of Article
II: A theory of standing constructed from injury, causation, and
redressability does little to advance the executive's enforcement priorities.
As Dean Nichol has observed, the "injured" plaintiff is no more likely than
the "uninjured" plaintiff to have objectives that coincide with the
executive's.'58 Indeed, a public-spirited executive sensitive to public choice
pressures might prefer that citizen groups focus on violations that have not
yet created exceptional, localized injuries. Political imperatives lead the
executive to respond to concentrated harms, so the usual story goes,
whereas diffuse or distant problems receive too little attention. The
redressability requirement generates similar dilemmas. Faced with resource
constraints, the executive may well prefer to train its prosecutorial
154. Bear in mind that many state court judges face the threat of ballot-box sanctions, or
recall by the other branches. Lifetime appointments for state judges are relatively uncommon.
155. One implication of this analysis is that congressional "incentives" (for example, grants-
in-aid, threats of preemption) for the states to open up their courts, as suggested in Grantham,
supra note 13, would pose a separation-of-powers problem.
156. But my view better fits the constitutional text, which in at least one place authorizes acts
by one branch that diminish the reach of another, yet without allowing interbranch transfer of
powers. See infra p. 1037 (discussing the Exceptions Clause).
157. See Redish & Cisar, supra note 135, at 480-90.
158. Gene R. Nichol, Jr., Justice Scalia, Standing, and Public Law Litigation, 42 DUKE L.J.
1141, 1163-65 (1993).
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capacities on present and looming violations, and leave it to citizens'
groups to collect the fines for past misfeasances. 5 9
Jurists devoted to prosecutorial and administrative discretion would do
well to scrutinize provisions for executive oversight and control of private
attorneys general, rather than exhaust their energies on standing. Perhaps
Article II should be read to entitle the executive to call off certain citizen-
initiated enforcement actions, but it should not be understood to mandate an
injury-causation-redressability brand of standing.
Moreover, it is by no means clear that Article II authorizes the
executive to ignore statutory directives. Professor Sunstein argues that both
the text and the history of the Take Care Clause point to an executive duty
commensurate with the executive's power. 6 ' This clause does not instruct
the executive to implement the laws as if they were written to fit the
executive's policy preferences; rather the executive is to implement the
laws faithfully, in accord with their structures, purposes, plain meanings,
and the like. Viewed from this perspective, Scalia's executive has the sheen
of an unconstitutional iiber-executive.
To recap, solicitude for the separation of powers does not warrant
imposing Article III on state court adjudication of federal questions. The
possibility of unreviewable state court decisions on federal questions poses
no practical threat to the supremacy of federal law. Nor can Congress usurp
executive prerogatives via the state courts. Statutes that authorize non-
Article III plaintiffs to bring claims in state court displace control over
standing law to the states; such statutes certainly do not arrogate executive
powers to Congress. Dispersals of power ought not to be countered with
institutionally formal separation-of-powers doctrines. My intuitions on this
point find reassurance in two further observations, which cast doubt on the
injury-causation-redressability theory of standing. First, conditioning
citizen suits on Article III standing does little to advance the executive's
role in implementing the law. Second, the Take Care Clause may not even
grant to the executive the discretion that Article III standing purportedly
safeguards. If the constitutional merits of Article III standing doctrine are
doubtful, judges should be chary of extending the reach of the doctrine.
Allowing state courts to apply their own standing law to federal claims may
ultimately feed back into better Article III doctrine, a point developed
below.
159. Justice Scalia's opinion for the Court in Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Environment,
523 U.S. 83 (1998), erects an Article III bar to this division of responsibilities. "
160. Cass R. Sunstein, What's Standing After Lujan? Of Citizen Suits, "Injuries, " and Article
111, 91 MICH. L. REV. 163, 212 (1992).
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D. Toward a (Loosely) Textually Anchored Defense of ASARCO
Given that a pragmatically formal conception of the separation of
powers does not condemn ASARCO, I propose to make a presumptive
decision between ASARCO and its competitor, the Freund-Fletcher rule,
with an even-handed assessment of the meaning of supremacy, and
textually anchored considerations of policy. With a presumption made, one
can survey the legal landscape for signs of reassurance, or reasons for
reconsideration.
Supremacy has twin meanings: power and quality. (Doubters may
check the dictionary.)' 6' To uphold the supremacy (power) of federal law is
to ensure that the states do not infringe upon the constitutionally
circumscribed domain of federal law, and to give maximal effect to the will
of Congress expressed in law, insofar as Congress acts within its limited
powers. These principles are exemplified, respectively, by the dormant
Commerce Clause16' and the nondiscrimination doctrine.1 6 3 But to uphold
the supremacy (quality) of federal law is also-if secondarily, for surely
supremacy as power was the Framers' main concern-to nourish rule-of-
law values like uniformity, to safeguard the political legitimacy of the
courts and other governing institutions,"16 and to make interpretations with
an eye to good results.
.The ASARCO rule better comports with the twin meanings of
supremacy than does the Freund-Fletcher alternative. Most importantly,
ASARCO poses no threat to the will of Congress (power) as embodied in its
environmental statutes. To the contrary, federal environmental law typically
provides for citizen-suit enforcement by "any person." It is the Supreme
Court's Article III jurisprudence that prevents the congressional scheme
from being realized in the federal courts. Allowing non-Article III plaintiffs
to be heard in state courts would enable the private attorney general to
work, functionally, more like Congress intended.
Second, even though ASARCO authorizes state courts to issue
nonreviewable interpretations of federal law, the holding presents virtually
no risk of state encroachment on the federal domain, and it poses only a
minor, short-term threat to uniformity. If a state's high court decides for a
161. 17 THE OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 274 (2d ed. 1989) defines supremacy as follows:
"1. The condition of being supreme in authority, rank, or power; position of supreme or highest
authority or power.... 2. Supreme position in achievement, character, or estimation."
162. Dormant Commerce Clause jurisprudence bars state legislatures from burdening
interstate commerce without express authorization from Congress. See generally LAURENCE H.
TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW §§ 6-2 to 6-26 (3d ed. 2000) (discussing Supreme
Court dormant Commerce Clause cases).
163. See supra Section I1D.
164. Here quality and power run together- Legitimacy is a feature of good law, and in the
long run, it may be necessary for powerful law too.
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non-Article III plaintiff, there is no problem at all-the U.S. Supreme Court
may review the state court ruling. If the state court decides against the
plaintiff, it creates unreviewable state court precedent for an improperly
narrow reading of the federal law. This is no cause for concern. As
suggested earlier, 165 Article III plaintiffs would forum-shop, pressing their
claims in federal court, where state court decisions carry no authority
beyond their intrinsic persuasiveness. In the rare circumstance that the law
at issue affects no particular, individualized, concrete interests, and thus no
Article III plaintiff conceivably exists, the question could still reach the
federal courts on appeal from another state supreme court's (contrary)
decision or, more likely, through enforcement proceedings brought by a
U.S. Attorney. During the intervening period, the only parties who would
be hurt by the state court's restrictive interpretation are those without
Article III standing-parties who would be forever excluded from the
courts, against the statutorily expressed will of Congress, under the Freund-
Fletcher model. 
166
Moving beyond quality-as-uniformity, my approach to the Supremacy
Clause inquires about impacts on the legitimacy of lawgiving institutions.
Judge Fletcher claims to have identified one problem with ASARCO in this
regard, namely, that it allows state courts to issue decisions binding in the
state yet untouchable by the institutional procedures-state legislative
action or constitutional amendment-that ordinarily correct judicial
overreaching.'67 Yet ASARCO positions the U.S. Supreme Court to correct
any instance of state court overreaching; it is only judicial underreaching
that remains immune to review. Nothing stands in the way of a state
legislature that wants to shore up (with state law) any federal statute or
constitutional clause that the state's courts have interpreted meanly.
Finally, one must ask whether ASARCO or the Freund-Fletcher
competitor would yield better results. One should proceed cautiously,
though, and not use this opening as a pretext for feeding personal policy
preferences into the Supremacy Clause. To this end I propose to read "good
results" in terms of immanent constitutional norms and opportunities for
learning about the consequences of constitutional doctrine. This connects
the good results and legitimacy facets of my analysis. Judicial rulings that
abjure the idea of judge as policy-kingmaker help to safeguard people's
trust in the courts. So too should interpretations that describe a coherent,
integrated Constitution.
165. See supra text accompanying notes 143-147.
166. Those who share Judge Fletcher's unwavering commitment to uniformity and remain
skeptical of my rebuttal may find it helpful to distinguish between state court adjudication of
statutory and constitutional claims brought by non-Article M plaintiffs. Congress can remedy
aberrant statutory interpretations. This process may not be easy or quick, but it is a far more
realistic check on state court error than constitutional amendment.
167. Fletcher, supra note 45, at 288-93.
2001] 1033
The Yale Law Journal
Understanding "good results" in terms of immanent constitutional
norms leads me at last to federalism, the most obvious rationale for the
ASARCO rule. Judge Fletcher dismisses federalism concerns by comparing
the common case-or-controversy requirement to exclusive federal
jurisdiction.' His analogy is inapt. The Freund-Fletcher rule burdens state
courts with responsibility for the arcane and cumbersome Article III
jurisprudence, whereas exclusive federal jurisdiction abates the federal
lading on state courts. State court rules of justiciability reflect state judicial
and legislative judgments about the efficient administration of justice and
the institutional competence of state courts. In a federal system, the national
branches ought to respect, presumptively, state courts' self-governance. A
plausible, incidental benefit of national respect for state courts is greater
state court attentiveness to federal interests and the fine points of federal
questions-which increases the effective supremacy of federal law.'69
I am not suggesting that the federal structure of the Constitution
mandates the ASARCO rule, or prevents Congress from requiring state
courts to abide by Article III when hearing federal questions. I propose only
that federalism, as a constitutional norm, should guide interpretive choices
when multiple avenues are open, as they are here. 7°
There remains but one more issue to consider, the opportunities-for-
learning aspect of "good results." Judge Fletcher maintains that the
common case-or-controversy requirement would make state and federal
courts "genuine partners," with salutary consequences for the doctrine of
standing.'7 ' Here again he shoots wide of the mark. True, state courts well-
practiced in the ways of liberal standing might vent their frustration with
federal strictures to the Supreme Court, to good effect. But it is a stretch to
maintain, as Judge Fletcher does, that this would make the Supreme Court
accountable to state courts. 7 ' The Supreme Court would remain free to spin
out the meaning of Article III as it wishes, and state courts would have to
follow suit. As for the alleged need for state court accountability to the
Supreme Court in standing decisions,'73 this seems to be either an opaque
168. Id. at 286-87.
169. Cf. Paul M. Bator, The State Courts and Federal Constitutional Litigation, 22 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 605, 624-25 (1981) (speculating about the psychology of state judges'
attentiveness to federal questions).
170. Here again I part ways with Brian Stem, who makes a much stronger federalism claim
than I do. See Stern, supra note 125, at 97-101. Stem insists that the Freund-Fletcher rule would
impinge on the states' right to distribute powers among the three branches of state government as
they see fit. This argument fails, however, because the Freund-Fletcher rule applies only when
state courts adjudicate federal questions, that is, when state courts serve as instrumentalities of the
national government. Under the Freund-Fletcher rule states would remain free to define the
judicial role without regard to Article I1 as regards questions of state law and state self-
governance.
171. Fletcher, supra note 45, at 284.
172. Id.
173. Id.
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reformulation of the institutionally formal Supremacy Clause argument, or
an unwarranted assault on state courts' competence. State supreme courts
are perfectly capable of developing standing doctrine without federal
oversight.
Contrary to Judge Fletcher's supposition, a common standard of
justiciability probably would impede the development of better standing
law. Students of standing would be positioned for keener insight were the
courts to apply a diversity of standing protocols to the same subject matter.
Right now, the requisite doctrinal array exists among the state courts, but
only rarely are these doctrines applied to the same substantive issues.'74 Yet
if the evolution of environmental law vindicates the predictions of this
Note, these varied conceptualizations of standing will come to be applied
with some frequency to the same body of substantive law. This will allow
academics better to assess the strengths and limitations of the Supreme
Court's standing doctrine. It thus augurs well for constructive developments
in case-or-controversy jurisprudence, more so than would a forced
"conversation" that amounts to lecture from one side and futile protestation
from the other.
To summarize, the Supreme Court is right to tolerate state court
adjudication of federal citizen-suits brought by non-Article III plaintiffs.
This practice allows a fuller realization of Congress's purpose in deputizing
private attorneys general. It respects the autonomy of state courts and
background norms of federalism. It bodes well for useful developments in
the doctrines of justiciability. And it poses at most only minor, short-term
threats to the uniformity of federal law.
E. ASARCO and the Legal Landscape
ASARCO compliments a number of jurisprudential developments that
recognize roles for public entities other than the federal courts in the
interpreting and developing of federal law. Judge Fletcher's survey of
the legal landscape emphasizes older sources: The Federalist Papers, the
Judiciary Act of 1789, and Chief Justice Marshall's pontifications on
the self-sufficiency of the federal government.175 Wrote Marshall, famously,
in McCulloch v. Maryland:
No trace is to be found in the constitution, of an intention to create
a dependence of the government of the Union on those of the states,
for the execution of the great powers assigned to it. Its means are
174. Consider how infrequently federal claims are brought in state courts. See supra
Subsection III.C.2.
175. Fletcher, supra note 45, at 283.
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adequate to its ends; and on those means alone was it expected to
rely for the accomplishment of its ends. 76
Marshall's rhetoric fit his age, when the idea of Union was still up for
grabs. Since then jurists have beaten a retreat from the rigid, absolutist
position that federal courts have sole responsibility for tracing the
lineaments of federal law. Consider four examples. First, administrative
law. Federal courts nowadays defer to administrative agencies' reasonable
constructions of ambiguous statutes. Though these statutes admit of many
interpretations, even the Supreme Court declines to enshrine its favorite.'77
Second, the political question doctrine, which reserves certain "political"
questions of law for resolution by the elected branches. 178  Third,
interpretations of the Exceptions Clause, which gives Congress a degree of
control over the Supreme Court's docket. 179 Fourth, "takings" of property
worked by state and local government. Occasionally the Supreme Court
grants certiorari to make known its views on local government
regulations, 8 ° but just as often it takes cases to advance a doctrine of
abstention, or to impose a new exhaustion requirement. 8' To paraphrase
Professors Tribe and Sager, ours is a Constitution of (federally) judicially
underenforced norms.1
82
Less noticed are the incipient fissures in federal courts' enforcement of
statutory law. Consider, for example, the Indian Civil Rights Act (ICRA),
which imposes most of the Bill of Rights on the relationship between
176. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 424 (1819).
177. See Chevron U.S.A. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
178. See generally J. Peter Mulhem, In Defense of the Political Question Doctrine, 137 U.
PA. L. REV. 97 (1988) (describing how the three branches share responsibility for constitutional
interpretation).
179. U.S. CONST. art. IH, § 2, cl. 2 ("[T]he supreme Court shall have appellate Jurisdiction,
both as to Law and Fact, with such Exceptions, and under such Regulations as the Congress shall
make."). As a historic matter, Congress has withheld Supreme Court review of most federal
criminal cases (for nearly a century); has limited Supreme Court review of state supreme court
decisions; and has enacted one "retaliatory" withdrawal of Supreme Court jurisdiction (upheld in
Ex parte McCardle, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 506 (1868)). Paul M. Bator, 27 VILL. L. REV 1030, 1040
(1982); cf. Stem, supra note 125, at 109- 10 (mentioning some of the same history).
180. When land-use zoning became popular in the 1920s, the Supreme Court decided in a
pair of cases that zoning was not unconstitutional on its face but could be applied
unconstitutionally. Nectow v. City of Cambridge, 277 U.S. 183 (1928) (examining due process
challenges to zoning); Vill. of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926) (same). The
Supreme Court got out of the land use business for sixty years, and reentered the debate mostly to
voice its approval of the predominant rules emerging from the state courts. Dolan v. City of
Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 389-91 (1994) (adopting and renaming the majority doctrine from the state
courts); Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 838-40 (1987) (aligning U.S.
constitutional law with the "approach taken by every other court ... with the exception of the
California state courts").
181. E.g., Williamson County Reg'l Planning Comm'n v. Hamilton Bank, 473 U.S. 172
(1985).
182. TRIBE, supra note 162, §§ 4-12 to 4-13, at 260-64 (discussing Lawrence Gene Sager,




Indians and their tribal governments.' 83 The Supreme Court reads the Indian
Civil Rights Act to allow only habeas claims in federal court; all other
claims must be resolved in tribal tribunals."8 4 This interpretation yields a
workable balance and dialogue between national and tribal norms.
I concede that principles of statutory construction peculiar to federal
Indian law figured into the Supreme Court's interpretation of the ICRA. But
on a much more pedestrian front, the federal courts are now affirming an
isomorphic pairing of federal law and state jurisdiction under the Telephone
Consumer Protection Act of 1991.' Four circuit courts have read this law
to vest exclusive jurisdiction in the state courts. s6 Only a lone district court
in Indiana views the matter otherwise.
187
Reflect for a moment on the occasions in which federal courts have
stayed their hand. These outcroppings of restraint are not random
aberrations.' They cohere, when viewed through the Supremacy Clause
lens described in this Note. Deference to administrative agencies, even on
ambiguous questions of law, makes sense because, first, the agencies are
better positioned to evaluate consequences for public welfare (quality of
federal law), and, second, there is no "external" threat (that is, no threat
from the states) to the power of federal law. The political question doctrine
makes sense because, for a limited set of issues, the political legitimacy
costs of judicial involvement are feared to exceed the rule-of-law benefits.
An account of the Supremacy Clause sensitive to the legitimacy of
federal law is the only way to make sense of the Exceptions Clause. A
delicate measure, the Exceptions Clause allows Congress to retaliate against
a "bad" Court-but not by arrogating judicial powers to the legislative
branch. Rather, when Congress withdraws appellate jurisdiction from the
Supreme Court, it is the state courts and lower federal courts that gain
authority. A theory of the separation of powers that mandates the Freund-
Fletcher rule would also require that the Exceptions Clause be read out of
the Constitution.
Finally, the Court's reluctant policing of local government "takings"
bears a relation to the Court's self-denying gloss on the ICRA. While
counties and municipalities are not "sovereigns" like Indian tribes, valued
histories and practices of self-governance do exist among counties and
183. 25 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1341 (1994).
184. Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 72 (1978).
185. 47 U.S.C. § 227 (1994).
186. Murphey v. Lanier, 204 F.3d 911 (9th Cir. 2000); ErieNet, Inc. v. Velocity Net, Inc.,
156 F.3d 513 (3d Cir. 1998); Foxhall Realty Law Offices, Inc. v. Telecomm. Premium Servs., 156
F.3d 432 (2d Cir. 1998); Int'l Sci. & Tech. Inst., Inc. v. Inacom Communications, Inc., 106 F.3d
1146 (4th Cir. 1997).
187. Kenro, Inc. v. Fax Daily, Inc., 962 F. Supp. 1162 (S.D. Ind. 1997).
188. With the possible exception of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act, which presents
a routine question of statutory construction.
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municipalities, particularly as regards the use of land. Federalism norms cry
out for protection. The Supremacy Clause meets federalism halfway in a
compromise that gives state courts primary responsibility for the
interpretation and enforcement of federal constitutional restraints on local
land-use controls.
V. CONSEQUENCES
Lest the arguments of this Note come across as idle speculation, I now
draw the reader's attention to a practical, real-world domain that could be
thoroughly restructured by non-Article III plaintiffs in state courts: citizen
suits for "past" violations of federal environmental laws. Recall the illogic
of constitutional barriers to citizen suits for past violations. Public choice
pressures lead the executive to focus on exceptional and immediate harms;
citizens' groups can help fulfill a statute's promise of deterrence by
bringing claims for past violations that otherwise would be overlooked.'89
In Gwaltney of Smithfield Ltd. v. Chesapeake Bay Foundation,9 '
decided in 1987, a unanimous Supreme Court read the jurisdictional
language of the CWA to preclude citizen suits for wholly past violations.
This case had widespread implications, for several other statutes parroted
the jurisdictional provision of the CWA, which authorizes citizen suits
against parties alleged "to be in violation" of their discharge permits.' 9'
Since the mid-1980s, Congress has been somewhat more fastidious in its
diction. 192 EPCRA, for instance, authorizes any person to sue an owner or
operator of a facility "for failure to do" any of several mandates, some of
which are time-specific.19'
EPCRA requires companies to divulge their annual releases of toxic
chemicals. Prospective defendants who receive notice of a pending suit
usually disclose the requisite information and move for dismissal if the suit
is filed. Until 1995, when the Sixth Circuit decided Atlantic States Legal
Foundation, Inc. v. United Musical Instruments, U.S.A., Inc.,"9 every
district court that had faced the question distinguished EPCRA from the
CWA and allowed these suits to proceed. 195 United Musical Instruments
189. See supra pp. 1030-31.
190. 484 U.S. 49 (1987).
191. ROBERT V. PERCIVAL ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION: LAW, SCIENCE, AND
POLICY 1088-89 (1996).
192. Id.
193. 42 U.S.C. § 11046(1994).
194. 61 F.3d 473 (6th Cir. 1995).
195. This claim is advanced by the Seventh Circuit in Citizens for a Better Environment v.
Steel Co., 90 F.3d 1237, 1243 (7th Cir. 1996) (citing Del. Valley Toxics Coalition v. Kurz-
Hastings, Inc., 813 F. Supp. 1132 (E.D. Pa. 1993); Williams v. Leybold Techs., 784 F. Supp. 765




shut the door, extending the Supreme Court's conclusions in Gwaltney to
EPCRA. Less than a year later, however, the Seventh Circuit nudged it
open again in Citizens for a Better Environment v. Steel Co.' 9'
The Supreme Court granted certiorari and forged a new path, in effect
reinterpreting Gwaltney as a standing decision. Justice Scalia, writing for
the Court, held that the citizen-plaintiffs failed the test of redressability. '97
The plaintiffs had sought a declaratory judgment, civil penalties, costs and
attorneys fees, an order requiring the petitioner to provide the respondent
with copies of reports submitted to the EPA, and authorization to inspect
Steel Company's facilities. None of these, posited Scalia, would ameliorate
or compensate for past harms. Concurring in the judgment, Justice Stevens,
joined by Justices Souter and Ginsburg, declined to reach the question of
standing, ruling instead that the jurisdictional provisions of EPCRA do not
allow citizen claims for wholly past violations.
In the wake of Steel Co., public interest groups basically gave up on
EPCRA suits,'98 just as the Seventh Circuit feared they would.'99 This is no
trivial matter. Suits for disclosure under EPCRA can be keystones for
community organizing, and the unwelcome publicity that disclosure of
pollution data attracts has led many companies to reduce their chemical
emissions voluntarily.2 °°
The arguments developed in this Note suggest that citizen suits for past
violations have a future in state courts, but whether EPCRA, as it now
stands, will prove enforceable in state courts remains an open question.
Concurrent jurisdiction is debatable,20 1 and state courts may adopt the
statutory construction endorsed by Justices Stevens, Souter, and Ginsberg
in Steel Co. 2°2 Still, the window of opportunity remains. If state courts
196. 90F.3d 1237.
197. Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env., 523 U.S. 83, 104-09 (1998). The defendant had
made the disclosures required by EPCRA upon receiving the plaintiffs' notice-of-intent-to-sue
letter.
198. Interview with Alex Levinson, Coordinating Attorney, The Sierra Club, in San
Francisco, Cal. (July 10, 1999).
199. Steel Co., 90 F.3d. at 1244 ("The incentives created by the district court's interpretation
[eventually reinstated by the Supreme Court] would render the citizen enforcement provision
virtually meaningless.").
200. For a general overview of EPCRA's role and impact, see Julie Shambarger Mitchell,
Note, Environmental Law-A Citizen Suit Under EPCRA Is No Longer a Threat- Steel Company
v. Citizens for a Better Environment 118 S. Ct. 1003 (1998), 21 U. ARK. LITrLE ROCK L. REv.
343 (1999), and sources cited therein.
201. See supra notes 81-106 and accompanying text.
202. But they should not. The Steel Co. concurrence is an exemplar of construction to avoid
constitutional doubt. With the constitutional question settled (by the majority), there is no longer a
reason for courts to twist the meaning of the statute, as the Steel Co. concurrence would have
done.
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prove reluctant to construe EPCRA to allow citizen suits for wholly past
violations, Congress may amend the law to clarify its intent.0 3
I use the example of EPCRA only to illustrate how state court lawsuits
can embolden environmental plaintiffs, not to channel strategizing. State
court standing will be useful not only for sidestepping the "past violations"
problem under EPCRA and other laws, but also for suits where "injury"
depends on ecologically complex causal links, or where human activity
threatens remote and rarely visited lands. It follows, inter alia, that
endangered species that persist among the wildland fringes of our quite
thoroughly cultivated and built-up nation may also number among the main
beneficiaries of state-court citizen suits.
It is worth remembering, though, that state-court citizen suits will not
prove a panacea for non-Article III plaintiffs. The reasons are varied. State
court jurisdiction over federal claims exists by grace or oversight of
Congress. The background law of standing surely remains strict in some
states, as yet unleavened by public-import exceptions or environmental
rights acts. Courts in states with "liberal" standing may yet decide to apply
Article III jurisprudence to federal claims; there appear to be no substantial
doctrinal roadblocks to this sort of "discrimination" against federal
claims."°
More fundamentally, non-Article III plaintiffs' claims against the
national government or its agents face bleak prospects. As defendants,
federal employees and agencies have an "absolute" right to remove
lawsuits to federal court, under 42 U.S.C. § 1442,205 in contradistinction to
other defendants' right of removal under 42 U.S.C. § 1441 .206 Thus two
federal circuits have stated that dismissal, not remand, is the proper
response to non-Article III lawsuits removed pursuant to § 1442.207
203. The legislative trend points toward strengthened citizen-suit provisions. See Jeffrey G.
Miller, Private Enforcement of Federal Pollution Control Laws: The Citizen Suit Provisions,
SD88 ALl ABA 819 (1999).
204. Rooted in the Supremacy Clause, the Supreme Court's "nondiscrimination doctrine"
bars state courts from discriminating against "federal rights" except in limited circumstances that
to date have included only "neutral rules of judicial administration." Howlett v. Rose, 496 U.S.
356, 374-75 (1990). Using different rules of standing fur state-law and federal-law claims would
hardly seem neutral. But dicta in Alden v. Maine discredit the notion that the Supremacy Clause
might require state court judges to entertain federal law cases beyond the competence of Article
III judges. 527 U.S. 706, 753 (1999) ("There can be no serious contention ... that the Supremacy
Clause imposes greater obligations on state court judges than on the Judiciary of the United States
itself."). By equating "federal right" not with "federal claim" but with "federal claim
enforceable in federal court," the Supreme Court could rescue the state court that "discriminates"
against federal claims by importing Article III standing. The state court's practice would
discriminate, but not against a federal right. In light of the forceful dicta in Alden, and the
separation-of-powers concerns canvassed in Section IV.C supra, it would be foolish to expect the
High Court to decide otherwise.
205. Arizona v.Manypenny, 451 U.S. 232, 242 (1981).
206. See supra notes 55-56 and accompanying text.
207, Int'l Primate Prot. League v. Adm'rs of the Tulane Educ. Fund, 895 F.2d 1056, 1061
(5th. Cir. 1990), rev'd on other grounds, 500 U.S. 72 (1991); Maine Ass'n of Interdependent
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State Courts
Moreover, dicta from the Supreme Court casts doubt on state courts' ability
to enforce judgments against federal defendants. 0 8
In short, the niche I have identified for non-Article III plaintiffs extends
only to claims against private and state parties, and exists largely at the
sufferance of state courts and legislatures. That the niche is small does not
make it trivial. Many state courts and legislatures have shown surprising
solicitude for public-interest plaintiffs in general, and environmental
petitioners in particular. And in our world of market economics and
"cooperative federalism," environmental outcomes everywhere depend on
private actors and state agencies.
This Note assesses the state of the law, not the state of environmental
lawyering. Out of curiosity, though, I asked some of the leading plaintiff-
side environmental lawyers for their views on why environmentalists have
not considered and encouraged state court enforcement actions by non-
Article III plaintiffs. Some expressed anxiety about biased adjudication, or
state judges' lack of familiarity with the technical content of national
environmental law.2"9 Others observed that many public-interest lawyers
once clerked for federal judges and now practice principally in federal
court; they are simply most comfortable in the federal setting.210 Two of the
lawyers wondered if the defendant's right of removal would pose an
impediment to federal law claims brought in state court by non-Article III
plaintiffs."
None of my respondents suggested that state "cooperative federalism"
laws (enabling state implementation of national programs) obviate the need
Neighborhoods v. Comm'r, Maine Dep't of Human Serv., 876 F.2d 1051, 1055 (1st Cir. 1989).
These cases make questionable inferences from Manypenny, 451 U.S. 232, but they nonetheless
constitute discouraging precedent for the would-be non-Article I plaintiff with claims against
federal defendants.
208. See Yellow Freight Sys., Inc. v. Donnelly, 494 U.S. 820, 825 (1990); cf San Bernardino
Valley Audubon Soc'y v. Metro. Water Dist., 83 Cal. Rptr. 2d 836 (Ct. App. 1999) (abstaining
from judging the adequacy of an Incidental Take Permit issued by the U.S. Fish and Wildlife
Service).
209. Interview with Michael Bean, Senior Attorney, Environmental Defense, in Washington,
D.C. (Dec. 28, 2000); E-mail Interviews with Mitchell Bernard, Senior Staff Attorney, Natural
Resources Defense Council (Jan. 23, 2001); Rebecca Bernard, Associate Attorney, Earthjustice
Legal Defense Fund (Jan. 24, 2001); Doug Honnold, Managing Attorney, Northern Rockies
Office, Earthjustice Legal Defense Fund (Jan. 22, 2001); Vickie Patton, Senior Attorney,
Environmental Defense (Dec. 26, 2000) (describing the "conventional but unsupported view" that
federal courts are more hospitable); and Michael Sherwood, Managing Attorney, San Francisco
Office, Earthjustice Legal Defense Fund (Jan. 26, 2001).
210. Interview with Alex Levinson, Environmental Legal Director, The Sierra Club, in San
Francisco, Cal. (July 10, 1999); Telephone Interviews with Jim Morman, President and CEO,
Taxpayers Against Fraud (Jan. 19, 2000); and Robert Wiygul, Senior Attorney, Earthjustice Legal
Defense Fund (Jan. 23, 2000).
211. Interview with Jim Morman, supra note 210; E-mail Interview with Vickie Patton,
supra note 209. Regarding the legal bases for their concern, see supra notes 55-56, 205-206, and
accompanying text.
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for federal-law citizen suits aimed at state and private defendants. '1 2 Yet
only one of the practitioners had investigated state courts as a solution to
Article III standing. 213 "No one ever questioned AT&T's long distance
monopoly," quipped one veteran public interest lawyer, "until a brazen
fellow founded a company called MCI and proved that AT&T had no
statutory basis for its position."' 214 State-court/federal-law enforcement
actions by non-Article III plaintiffs will not revolutionize environmental
law like MCI did telecommunications, but the comparison ought not to
tarnish any modest gains around the margins.
VI. CONCLUSION
Standing is an especial problem for the enforcement of environmental
laws, many of which do not aim, or aim directly, to prevent "injuries" to
people. The existence of an Article III plaintiff positioned to challenge a
violation can be fortuitous. This Note predicts and defends a turn toward
the state courts, which can hear the federal claims of plaintiffs who lack
Article III standing.
My prediction of a new role for state courts in the enforcement of
federal environmental law emerges from three recent developments in
Supreme Court jurisprudence. During the late 1980s and 1990s, the
Supreme Court extended its doctrine of standing in ways that curb
environmentalists' access to the federal courts. Meanwhile, the Court
strengthened the presumption of state court jurisdiction over federal laws.
Lastly, in ASARCO v. Kadish, the Supreme Court affirmed the right of state
courts to hear the federal claims of non-Article III plaintiffs, and gave
judgments in favor of non-Article LI plaintiffs collateral effect in federal
court.
The new niche for state courts will not extend to every violation of the
federal environmental statutes. There are three limiting factors. First, the
environmental statutes tend to be textually ambiguous on the question of
state court jurisdiction, though seven of the nine major statutes likely admit
of concurrent jurisdiction when read in the light of the Supreme Court's
most recent decisions. Second, claims against the instrumentalities of the
federal government face constitutional and statutory barriers. Finally, the
states have discretion to impose Article III standing on federal law
claimants-though many state courts interpret standing quite liberally,
especially in environmental cases.
212. On cooperative federalism and the indirect enforcement of federal standards through
state law, see supra text accompanying note 121.
213. This was Alex Levinson of the Sierra Club, for whom I did the research that grew into
this Note.
214. Interview with Jim Morman, supra note 210.
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State Courts
State court adjudication of non-Article III plaintiffs' ,federal claims has
encountered some resistance from academics over the years. The most
thoughtful attack issued from the pen of Judge Fletcher, a year after the
Supreme Court decided ASARCO. This Note calls into question Judge
Fletcher's critique.
I locate my defense of ASARCO-and the associated conception of the
Supremacy Clause-in the context of the Supreme Court's recent holdings
on federalism and the separation of powers. When interpreting a structural
feature of the Constitution, I argue, the Supreme Court should begin with an
inquiry into dangers. If the provision guards against "tyranny" or another
catastrophe, the Court should impose a doctrine of formal rules that keep
one branch from assuming control over the settled practices of another. If
the provision calls into doubt core, settled practices of governance that do
not hint at a looming conflict or a power grab between the executive and
legislative branches, the Court has little choice but to cast its decision in
terms of flexible standards. Otherwise, the Court should assemble doctrine
from an even-handed reading of the constitutional text.
State court adjudication of federal claims raised by non-Article III
plaintiffs neither suggests the prospect of an interbranch power-grab, nor
calls into doubt settled practices of governance. Thus my argument turns to
the text. Supremacy has twin meanings: power and quality. The ASARCO
rule, I suggest, better serves the power and quality of federal law than
would the common case-or-controversy alternative favored by Professor
Freund and Judge Fletcher. As regards power, ASARCO gives maximal
effect to the will of Congress as expressed in federal statutes, and permits
virtually no state encroachment on the domain of federal law. As regards
quality, ASARCO meshes with immanent norms of federalism and creates
new opportunities for learning about standing doctrine. Any threat ASARCO
may pose to the uniformity of federal law is de minimis. Furthermore,
ASARCO fits comfortably into the modern legal landscape, which features
important roles for institutions other than the federal courts in developing
federal law.
10432001]
The Yale Law Journal
APPENDIX: FEDERAL ENVIRONMENTAL CLAIMS IN STATE COURTS
Number of
Federal Statute Citizen Suits in Case Citations
State Courts
215
Clean Air Act 0 n/a
Clean Water Act 3 Kerns v. Dukes, 707 A.2d 363
(Del. 1998); Berens v. Cook, 694
N.Y.S.2d 684 (App. Div. 1999);
Puget Soundkeepers Alliance v.
State, Dep't of Ecology, 9 P.3d 892




Cleanup, and Liability Act
Emergency Planning and 0
Community Right-To- n/a
Know Act
Endangered Species Act 3 Hammond v. N. Slope Borough,
645 P.2d 750 (Alaska 1982); San
Bernardino Valley Audubon Soc.
v. Metro. Water Dist., 83 Cal. Rptr.
2d 836 (Ct. App. 1999); Prairie
Dog Advocates v. City of
Lakewood, 2000 WL 674879
(Colo. Ct. App. 2000)
Marine Mammal 1 Hammond v. N. Slope Borough,
Protection Act 645 P.2d 750 (Alaska 1982)
Resources Conservation 3 Jilot v. State, 944 P.2d 566 (Colo.
and Recovery Act Ct. App. 1996); Grand E. Props. v.
Phillips, No. CV 940364608, 1996
WL 151229 (Conn. Super. Ct. Mar.
4, 1996);*Andrews v. Caron Bros.,
No. 45136, 1992 WL 67396 (Conn.
Super. Ct. Mar. 26, 1992)*
Safe Drinking Water Act 1 Andrews v. Caron Bros., No.
45136, 1992 WL 67396 (Conn.
Super. Ct. Mar. 26, 1992)*
Surface Mining Control 1 Castle Valley Special Serv. Dist. v.
and Reclamation Act Utah Bd. of Oil, Gas, & Mining,
938 P.2d 248 (Utah 1996)
215. This enumeration may be slightly underinclusive. See supra note 80.
216. This statute reserves exclusive jurisdiction to the federal courts. See 42 U.S.C.
§ 9613(a)-(b) (1994).
* At issue here are tort claims that purport to establish negligence per se by showing the
violation of a federal statute; but in both cases the state court analyzes its jurisdiction to hear
citizen suits under the federal statute.
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